A.F.R.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C) No.7589 of 2024
CNR No- ODHC010218872024

(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950).

Orissa Stevedors Ltd., Cuttack **....** ***Petitioner (s)***

-versus-

Chief Executive Officer, Central Marketing Organization, SAIL, New Delhi. **....** ***Opposite Party (s)***

Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode**:**

For Petitioner (s) : *Mr. Jaydeep Pal, Adv.*
along with Ms. A Pal, Adv.

For Opposite Party (s) : *Mr. Nirod Ku. Sahu, Sr. Adv.*
Along with M/s. S. Sahu, Adv.

CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

DATE OF HEARING:-11.08.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-09.10.2026

Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

1. The present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question the order dated 03.01.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack in ARBP No. 03 of 2023, whereby the learned Commercial Court accepted the application filed by the Opposite Party for condonation of delay and admitted the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, "the Act") for setting aside the arbitral award dated 16.12.2022.

2. The controversy is a narrow one. It concerns the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act and whether the learned Commercial Court was justified in accepting the explanation furnished by the Opposite Party for the short period beyond three months, assuming the date of 16.12.2022 to be the date from which limitation commenced.

I. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The Opposite Party had participated in Arbitration Proceeding No. 23 of 2019 before the learned Sole Arbitrator, Justice J.P. Das, former Judge of this Court. The arbitral proceedings culminated in an award dated 16.12.2022. By the said award, the learned Arbitrator directed refund of the amounts recovered from the running bills of the claimant-contractor, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of recovery till payment.

4. On 16.12.2022, the learned Arbitrator pronounced the award and directed that a signed copy thereof be handed over to the counsel appearing for the respective parties. A copy of the award was received by Sri S.K. Nayak, Advocate, on behalf of the side represented by the Opposite Party. It is not in dispute that Sri N.K. Sahu, Advocate, who was representing the Opposite Party in the arbitral proceedings, was present before the learned Arbitrator on that date. The record also discloses that on earlier dates Sri S.K. Nayak had received order sheets on behalf of Sri N.K. Sahu.

5. The Opposite Party, however, maintains that Sri S.K. Nayak was not the counsel engaged by it in the arbitration proceedings. According to the Opposite Party, its counsel were Sri N.K. Sahu and Sri T.K. Pattanaik. It was therefore its case that receipt of the award by Sri S.K. Nayak could not constitute receipt of the award by the "party" for the purposes of Section 34(3) of the Act.

6. The Opposite Party states that this position came to the notice of its conducting counsel when the petition under Section 34 was ready for filing on 16.03.2023. On the same date, a certified copy of the award was applied for. The certified copy was received on 22.03.2023 and the application under Section 34, registered as ARBP No. 03 of 2023, was instituted on that very date.

7. At the stage of scrutiny, an objection was raised by the Registry regarding limitation. Thereafter, on 12.04.2023, the Opposite Party filed an application seeking condonation of the delay. The Opposite Party's case before the learned Commercial Court was that the substantive application under Section 34 had already been filed on 22.03.2023 and that the subsequent application for condonation was filed only because the Registry had raised an objection.

8. The learned Commercial Court considered the provisions of Section 34(3), the judgments relied upon by the parties and, in particular, the question whether receipt of the award by an advocate or agent could constitute receipt by the "party" within the meaning of the Act. It relied

upon ***Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters (P) Ltd.***[1], and ***Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors***[2]. The learned Commercial Court also considered the Hon'ble Delhi High Court's judgment in ***Ministry of Health and Family Welfare v. Hosmac Projects Division of Hosmac India (P) Ltd.***[3].

9. The learned Commercial Court ultimately held that the award had been received by the junior associates of the counsel representing the Opposite Party on 16.12.2022, that the certified copy was applied for on 16.03.2023 and received on 22.03.2023, and that the Section 34 application was filed on the same date. It further observed that even if the period was reckoned from 16.12.2022, the application was within the further period of thirty days contemplated by the proviso to Section 34(3). The application for condonation of delay was accordingly disposed of and the Section 34 proceedings were admitted.

II. PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS:

10. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that the award was received on 16.12.2022 by Sri S.K. Nayak, Advocate, who was an associate of Sri N.K. Sahu, the counsel representing the Opposite Party. It is contended that Sri N.K. Sahu himself was present before the learned Arbitrator on 16.12.2022 and had directed his associate to receive the award. According to the Petitioner, the receipt of the award

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[1] (2012) 9 SCC 496

[2] (2005) 4 SCC 239

[3] FAO(OS)(COMM) No. 326 of 2019, decided on 20.12.2023

by Sri S.K. Nayak therefore amounted to effective receipt on behalf of the Opposite Party.

11. It is further submitted that the period of three months expired before the filing of ARBP No. 03 of 2023 on 22.03.2023. The Petitioner submits that the application for condonation of delay was itself filed only on 12.04.2023 and, therefore, the Opposite Party failed to explain the entire period of delay. It is contended that the application seeking condonation of delay did not explain why, if the award had admittedly been received on 16.12.2022, the challenge was not instituted within the prescribed period.

12. Learned counsel submits that the Opposite Party cannot approbate and reprobate: having filed an application seeking condonation of delay on 12.04.2023, it cannot subsequently contend that there was no delay at all. The Petitioner also submits that the plea that the delay arose on account of an "office error" or a bona fide impression regarding receipt of the award is an afterthought and does not constitute sufficient cause.

13. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.***[4] and ***Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) v. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.***[5]. It is submitted that the legislative policy underlying the Act is one of expedition and finality and that the Court cannot enlarge the period prescribed by Section 34(3).

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[4] (2001) 8 SCC 470

[5] (2021) 6 SCC 460

14. It is thus contended that the learned Commercial Court acted contrary to the statutory scheme in condoning the delay and that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error warranting interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

III. OPPOSITE PARTY'S CONTENTIONS:

15. *Per contra*, learned counsel appearing for the Opposite Party submits that the entire challenge proceeds upon an incorrect premise that receipt of the award by Sri S.K. Nayak on 16.12.2022 constituted receipt by the party within the meaning of Section 34(3).

16. It is submitted that Sri S.K. Nayak was not the counsel engaged by the Opposite Party in the arbitral proceedings. The Opposite Party had engaged Sri N.K. Sahu and Sri T.K. Pattanaik. Receipt of an award by an advocate who was not the party to the arbitration agreement cannot, according to the Opposite Party, be equated with receipt by the party for commencement of limitation under Section 34(3).

17. Learned counsel further submits that the Opposite Party acted promptly upon becoming aware of the objection. A certified copy was applied for on 16.03.2023, received on 22.03.2023 and the Section 34 application was filed on the very same day. Thus, even assuming that 16.12.2022 is taken as the starting point, the delay in filing the substantive application was only a short period beyond three months and well within the further period of thirty days permitted by the proviso to Section 34(3).

18. It is also submitted that the application for condonation of delay dated 12.04.2023 cannot be treated as the date of filing of the Section 34

proceedings. The substantive application had already been filed on 22.03.2023. The subsequent application was filed only in response to the office objection.

19. Learned counsel relies upon ***Benarsi Krishna Committee*** **(supra),** ***Tecco Trichy*** **(supra),** ***N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy***[6] and other authorities cited before the learned Commercial Court. It is submitted that the explanation furnished by the Opposite Party was bona fide, there was no deliberate or negligent delay, and no prejudice would be caused by allowing the Section 34 application to be considered on merits.

IV. ISSUE AND ANALYSIS:

20. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on consideration of the materials on record, the following solitary question arises for consideration:

> **WHETHER THE LEARNED COMMERCIAL COURT ERRED IN CONDONING THE DELAY AND ADMITTING THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE OPPOSITE PARTY UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996?**

21. Before examining the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to revert to the statutory provisions which govern the instant controversy.

22. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, insofar as relevant for the present controversy, provides that an application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months

[6] (1998) 7 SCC 123

have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application had received the arbitral award or, where a request under Section 33 had been made, from the date on which such request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. The proviso permits the Court, upon being satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, to entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

23. The statutory scheme is therefore clear. The prescribed period commences from the date on which the party making the application received the arbitral award. The proviso does not confer an unrestricted power of condonation. The Court may entertain the application within the further period of thirty days if sufficient cause is established, but the statutory outer limit cannot be extended.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Union of India v. Popular Construction Co***. (supra), has held that the expression "but not thereafter" in the proviso to Section 34(3) excludes the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, a Court cannot entertain an application under Section 34 beyond the further period of thirty days prescribed by the proviso.

25. There is, therefore, no question in the present case of enlarging the statutory period on equitable considerations. The controversy has to be examined in two stages: first, whether limitation commenced on 16.12.2022 by reason of delivery of the award to Sri S.K. Nayak; and secondly, if that date is taken as the starting point, whether the Section

34 application instituted on 22.03.2023 was within the further period of thirty days and, if so, whether sufficient cause was established.

A. Receipt of the Award and Commencement of Limitation Period.

26. Section 34(3) does not make the date of the award the starting point of limitation. The statutory starting point is the date on which the party making the application received the arbitral award.

27. This provision has to be read with Section 31(5) of the Act, which requires that after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy thereof shall be delivered to each party. The expression "party" is defined in Section 2(1)(h) as meaning a party to the arbitration agreement.

28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors*** (supra), emphasised that delivery of the award under Section 31(5) is not a mere procedural formality. It is the event which sets the limitation period under Section 34(3) in motion. The Hon'ble Court also recognised that, particularly in the case of a large governmental organisation, the relevant question is whether the award was received by the person who was directly connected with the arbitral proceedings and who was in a position to understand and appreciate the award and take an informed decision regarding the course to be adopted against it.

29. The principle was considered further in ***Benarsi Krishna Committee v. Karmyogi Shelters (P) Ltd.*** (supra). The decision makes clear that the expression "party" in Sections 31(5) and 34(3) cannot simply be equated with every advocate or representative who happens to have authority to act for a litigant. The fact of representation, by itself, does not make

every person receiving a copy of an award the statutory recipient contemplated by Section 31(5).

30. The position has recently been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***M/s Motilal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr.***[7]. The Hon'ble Court reiterated that the statutory reference is to the "party" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(h), while also reaffirming the principle in ***Tecco Trichy*** (supra) that, in the context of an organisation, the relevant recipient must be a person connected with the proceedings and capable of understanding and appreciating the award and taking the decision whether a challenge should be instituted.

31. ***Motilal Agarwala*** (supra) therefore does not lay down an absolute rule that receipt by every authorised representative, advocate or officer is necessarily irrelevant. Nor does it establish that the mere physical receipt of the award by any person associated with the proceedings invariably commences limitation. The inquiry remains one of substance that is whether the person to whom the signed copy was delivered was, in the circumstances of the case, the appropriate person through whom delivery to the party was legally effective for purposes of Section 31(5) and Section 34(3).

32. This distinction is material in the present case. The Petitioner relies upon the fact that Sri S.K. Nayak, Advocate, received the signed copy of the award on 16.12.2022. It is further submitted that Sri N.K. Sahu, the advocate representing the Opposite Party in the arbitral

[7] 2025 INSC 1062

proceedings, was present before the learned Arbitrator on that date and that Sri S.K. Nayak was his associate. It is also pointed out that Sri S.K. Nayak had, on earlier occasions, received order sheets on behalf of Sri N.K. Sahu.

33. These circumstances undoubtedly establish a connection between Sri S.K. Nayak and the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. They also establish that the award was physically handed over on 16.12.2022 to an advocate associated with the counsel appearing for the Opposite Party. The question, however, is whether those circumstances, without more, establish that delivery to Sri S.K. Nayak constituted the statutory receipt of the award by the Opposite Party for purposes of Section 34(3).

34. On the material presently recorded, the Opposite Party has consistently maintained that its counsel formally engaged in the arbitral proceedings were Sri N.K. Sahu and Sri T.K. Pattanaik and that Sri S.K. Nayak was not himself the counsel formally engaged by the Opposite Party. There is no finding that Sri S.K. Nayak was authorised by the Opposite Party to receive the award on its behalf in such a manner as would constitute statutory delivery under Section 31(5), nor is there material demonstrating that Sri S.K. Nayak was the person responsible for advising the Opposite Party regarding acceptance or challenge of the award.

35. The fact that Sri S.K. Nayak had previously received order-sheets, or that he was associated with the counsel conducting the arbitration, is relevant but cannot by itself be treated as conclusive. Prior receipt of procedural documents may establish participation in the proceedings,

but the statutory question under Sections 31(5) and 34(3) concerns effective delivery of the signed award to the party in the legally contemplated manner.

36. The circumstance that Sri N.K. Sahu, the conducting counsel, was present when the award was pronounced also requires consideration. However, the record as presently placed before this Court does not establish that Sri S.K. Nayak was acting as the authorised recipient of the award on behalf of the Opposite Party, or that he was the person who, in terms of the principles stated in ***Tecco Trichy*** (supra) and reiterated in ***Motilal Agarwala*** (supra), was responsible for appreciating the award and taking the decision whether a challenge should be instituted.

37. The distinction between knowledge of the award and statutory receipt of the award must also be maintained. The fact that an advocate associated with the proceedings may have acquired knowledge of the award does not, by itself, answer the statutory question. What is material is whether the delivery was such as to constitute receipt by the party within the meaning of Section 31(5), thereby commencing the limitation period under Section 34(3).

38. In the circumstances of the present case, and in the absence of material establishing that Sri S.K. Nayak was the person authorised or otherwise situated so as to constitute the legally effective recipient of the award on behalf of the Opposite Party, this Court is unable to hold that limitation necessarily commenced on 16.12.2022 merely because the signed copy was physically handed over to him.

39. The conclusion is not based upon the proposition that an advocate can never receive an award on behalf of a party. Such a categorical proposition would be inconsistent with the principles emerging from ***Tecco Trichy*** (supra). The conclusion rests instead upon the evidentiary position in the present case: the record does not sufficiently establish that Sri S.K. Nayak occupied the position which would make his receipt of the award the statutory receipt contemplated by Sections 31(5) and 34(3).

40. The subsequent application for a certified copy on 16.03.2023 and its receipt on 22.03.2023 therefore assumes significance as evidence of the point at which the Opposite Party asserts that the award came to its notice in a manner enabling it to take the requisite legal decision. The Section 34 application was instituted on the same date when the certified copy was received, namely 22.03.2023. Because the Ld. Court below has not found that statutory receipt occurred on 16.12.2022, the March events become relevant to the Opposite Party's explanation and conduct, not necessarily as the statutory commencement date.

B. Alternative consideration, assuming 16.12.2022 to be the starting date

41. Even assuming, that receipt of the award by Sri S.K. Nayak on 16.12.2022 was sufficient to commence the limitation period, it is the opinion of this Court that the impugned order does not, for that reason alone, warrant interference.

42. The Section 34 application was instituted on 22.03.2023. The application seeking condonation of delay was filed subsequently on 12.04.2023, after an objection regarding limitation had been raised by the Registry.

43. The mere fact that the condonation application was filed subsequently does not, by itself, alter the date on which the substantive Section 34 application was instituted. The record before this Court records the institution of ARBP No. 03 of 2023 on 22.03.2023. The question, however, cannot end there. Since the application was filed beyond three months on the Petitioner's assumed computation, it was necessary for the Opposite Party to seek condonation within the further statutory period and to establish sufficient cause.

44. In ***Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd.***[8], the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the maintainability of an appeal against an order refusing to condone delay in filing an application under Section 34 of the Act, examined the scheme of Section 34(3). The Court reiterated that the period prescribed under Section 34(3) is a special statutory period and that, after expiry of the initial period of three months, the Court may entertain the application only within the further period of thirty days, upon sufficient cause being shown. The Court further observed that where the application under Section 34 is presented after expiry of the initial three-month period, but within the further period contemplated by the proviso, the prayer for condonation must be considered in the context of the statutory scheme.

[8] (2021) 4 SCC 602

45. The decision in ***Chintels*** (supra) does not, however, determine the anterior question arising in the present case, namely, the date on which the application under Section 34 is to be treated as having been instituted. Nor does it lay down that a subsequent application seeking condonation of delay, filed in response to a Registry objection, necessarily substitutes its own date for the date on which the substantive Section 34 application was presented. The procedural effect of the subsequent application must depend upon the circumstances in which the substantive application was presented and dealt with by the Registry, including whether the original application was treated as instituted subject to removal of an objection or was returned and subsequently presented afresh.

46. In the present case, the record indicates that the substantive application under Section 34 was presented on 22.03.2023. The Registry thereafter raised an objection regarding limitation, whereupon the Opposite Party filed an application seeking condonation of delay on 12.04.2023. There is no finding that the Section 34 application presented on 22.03.2023 was a non-est filing or that it was returned and thereafter presented afresh. The subsequent application for condonation must, therefore, be considered in the procedural context in which it came to be filed, rather than being treated, merely by reason of its later date, as the date on which the Section 34 proceedings were instituted.

47. The question, therefore, is whether, assuming 16.12.2022 to be the commencement date, the substantive Section 34 application presented on 22.03.2023 fell within the further period of thirty days contemplated

by the proviso to Section 34(3), and, if so, whether the explanation furnished by the Opposite Party constituted sufficient cause for not filing the application within the initial period. The answer to those questions must be considered on the basis of the procedural record and the explanation placed before the Commercial Court. On the dates recorded in the impugned order, the period of three months from 16.12.2022 expired on 16.03.2023. The Section 34 application was instituted on 22.03.2023. Thus, even on the Petitioner's own computation, the application was presented only a few days beyond the initial three-month period and well within the further period of thirty days permitted by the proviso to Section 34(3).

48. The fact that the application seeking condonation of delay was filed on 12.04.2023 therefore does not place the case beyond the statutory outer limit, as this Court accepts the Section 34 application as having been instituted on 22.03.2023 and treats the later application as curing or regularising the Registry objection rather than as constituting a fresh institution of the Section 34 proceedings.

49. The Court must nevertheless examine whether sufficient cause has been shown. The proviso to Section 34(3) does not operate automatically merely because the delay is short. The applicant must establish circumstances which prevented filing within the initial three-month period.

50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy*** (supra), has held, in the context of condonation of delay generally, that the length of delay is not by itself decisive and that the acceptability of

the explanation is material. That principle must, however, be applied subject to the special statutory regime contained in Section 34(3).

51. The explanation furnished by the Opposite Party is that Sri S.K. Nayak, who received the award on 16.12.2022, was not its formally engaged counsel; that the engaged counsel were Sri N.K. Sahu and Sri T.K. Pattanaik; that the question regarding receipt of the award came to the notice of the conducting counsel when the Section 34 petition was being prepared on 16.03.2023; that a certified copy was applied for on that date; that the copy was received on 22.03.2023; and that the Section 34 proceedings were instituted on the same day.

52. The conduct of the Opposite Party is relevant. There is no material indicating that, after becoming aware of the limitation issue, the Opposite Party deliberately allowed the statutory period to expire.

53. The decision in ***Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) v. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.***[9], emphasises the legislative policy of expeditious resolution of arbitral disputes and cautions against condoning delay in a manner inconsistent with that policy. That principle is fully applicable. It does not, however, eliminate the statutory discretion expressly preserved by the proviso to Section 34(3) where the application remains within the additional thirty-day period and sufficient cause is demonstrated.

[9] (2021) 6 SCC 460

54. The present case is materially distinguishable from one in which a party simply allows the entire statutory period and the additional thirty-day period to lapse.

55. The explanation offered is also directly connected with the disputed commencement of limitation. The Opposite Party did not merely rely upon vague administrative delay. It asserted that the person who physically received the award was not its formally engaged counsel and that the legal significance of that receipt was not appreciated until the matter came up for filing. Whether that explanation is ultimately sufficient is a matter of judicial assessment; and on the facts recorded by the Commercial Court its acceptance cannot be characterised as arbitrary or perverse.

56. The Court must, however, make it clear that this conclusion should not be understood as laying down a general proposition that receipt of an award by an associate advocate is incapable of commencing limitation. The effect of such receipt depends upon the authority, role and connection of the recipient with the arbitral proceedings and upon the circumstances establishing whether delivery to that person constituted effective delivery to the party within the meaning of Section 31(5).

57. On the material available on record in the present case, the Commercial Court was entitled to conclude that Sri S.K. Nayak's receipt did not conclusively establish statutory receipt by the Opposite Party on 16.12.2022. Even assuming otherwise, the Commercial Court was also entitled to examine the alternative plea for condonation because the

Section 34 application had been presented on 22.03.2023, within the additional thirty-day period.

58. The conclusion reached by the Commercial Court therefore cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Nor can it be said, on the material placed before this Court, that the Commercial Court acted upon a legally impermissible principle in accepting the explanation furnished by the Opposite Party.

59. There is yet another reason why the impugned order does not call for interference. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate. This Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over every discretionary order passed by a subordinate Court. Interference is warranted where the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, acted in a manner contrary to law, or where the impugned order suffers from patent perversity or results in grave failure of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised these limitations.

60. The instant case is not a case where the learned Commercial Court assumed a jurisdiction which it did not possess. Section 34(3) expressly confers upon the Court the power to entertain an application within a further period of thirty days upon being satisfied about sufficient cause. The Commercial Court exercised that jurisdiction on the basis of the dates and explanation placed before it. Nor is the conclusion reached by the Commercial Court one which no reasonable Court could have reached.

61. Even if another view on the facts were possible, such circumstance by itself would not justify interference under Article 227. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not an appellate jurisdiction permitting substitution of its own assessment for that of the subordinate Court merely because another conclusion may also be available.

V. CONCLUSION:

62. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no jurisdictional error, patent perversity or material illegality in the order dated 03.01.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack in ARBP No. 03 of 2023.

63. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

64. The order dated 03.01.2024 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Commercial Court), Cuttack in ARBP No. 03 of 2023 is affirmed.

65. The learned Commercial Court shall proceed with ARBP No. 03 of 2023 in accordance with law. It is made clear that this Court has expressed no opinion on the merits of the challenge to the arbitral award, and all questions available to the parties in the proceedings under Section 34 shall remain open for consideration by the learned Commercial Court in accordance with law.

66. There shall be no order as to costs.

67. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 9th October, 2026/-