HC-KAR

NC: 2026:KHC:59194
WP No. 26735 of 2025
C/W WP No. 53 of 2025

CNR: KAHC010571062025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH

WRIT PETITION NO.26735 OF 2025 (KLR-RES)

C/W

WRIT PETITION NO.53 OF 2025 (GM-ST/RN)

IN WP No. 26735/2025

BETWEEN:

1. M/S JPR INFRA PROJECTS
REGD. UNDER PARTNERSHIP FIRM,
HAING ITS JOFFICE AT NO. 1,
GROUND FLOOR,
SRI. LAVANYA SERENITY,
6TH MAIN, 13TH 'D' CROSS
VENKTAPURA EXTN,
KORAMANGALA 1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU – 560034.
REP BY ITS PARTNER
SRI. SHANKAR.J
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O LATE B JAYARAMA NAIDU,
R/AT NO.181, 18TH MAIN
HSR LAYOUT, 4TH SECTOR,
BENGALURU -560102.

2. SRI. SHANKAR J.

S/O LATE B. JAYARAMA NAIDU
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.181 18TH MAIN
HSR LAYOUT 4TH SECTOR
BENGALURU - 560102.

3. SRI. RAVIKUMAR J.
S/O LATE B JAYARAMA NAIDU
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.181 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUR 4TH SECTOR
BENGALURU - 560102.

4. SMT. PRIYADHARSHINI
W/O SRI. RAVIKUMAR J.
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
R/AT NO.181 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUR 4TH SECTOR
BENGALURU - 560102.

...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SARAVANA S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY
REPT BYITS REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIKAS SOUDHA
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU 560001.

2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE SOUTH TALUK
K.G.ROAD
BENGALURU – 560001.

3. THE TAHASILDAR
K.G.PURA
BANGALORE EAST TALUK
BENGALURU - 560016.

4. SRI. THULASIRAM S.
S/O LATE KRISHNA MANDADI SAPPANI
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
NOW RESIDING AT N0.2,
2ND MAIN, MANGAMANAPALYA MAIN ROAD,
ITI LAYOUT, SECTOR-7 HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU - 560068.

5. SRI T. SUDHAKAR
S/O T. BHASKARA CHOWDHARY,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
R/AT NO 406
VANDANA PRIME ROSE
APARTMENT YELUKUNTE VILLAGE,
HSR LAYOUT 3RD SECTOR,
BENGALURU – 560102.

6. SRI. VASUDEVA REDDY
S/O V.C.THIPPA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT NO 59/2A,
16TH CROSS, 21ST MAIN,
VANGALAHALLI , WATER TANK,
1ST SECTOR H.S.R. LAYOUT

BENGALURU 560102.

7. SMT. V.RAMYA
S/O SRI NARASIMHA MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/AT DHANAMITTENAHALLI VILLAGE,
KONAPALLI POST
CHINTAMANI TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPURA – 562101.

AND ALSO RESIDINT AT N0.203
SAMETHANAHALLIL,
THIRUMALASHETTYHALLI,
HOSAKOTE TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
BENGALURU - 562114.

8. SRI. PALA RAGHAVENDRA YADAV
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
S/O SRI PALA LAKSHMI NARASAIAH,
R/A FLAT NO.201
SSVS YADADRI TOWERS,
USHODAYA COLONY,
NEAR RAJAMANDRI SCHOOL
NIJJAMPET, TELANGANA - 500085

…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. ADITYA DIWAKARA, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI RAJAGOPAL NAIDU, ADVOCATE FOR R4 & R5;
SRI. M.S. HARINATH, ADVOCATE FOR R6 TO R8)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO

DECLARE THAT THE RESPONDENT REVENUE AUTHORITIES HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IT IS A CONVERTED NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND UNDER BBMP'S JURISDICTION AND DIRECT ALL REVENUE RECORDS IN RESPECT OF THE SCHEDULE PROPERTY BE MAINTAINED ONLY BY THE BBMP AUTHORITIES CONTINUING THE NAME OF PETITIONERS AND TO RESTRAIN THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT FROM INTERFERING WITH THE SUCH RECORDS; AND ETC.

IN WP NO. 53/2025

BETWEEN:

1. M/S. JPR INFRA PROJECTS
PARTNERSHIP FIRM,
(REGISTERED UNDER PROVISIONS OF INDIAN PARTNERSHIP ACT)
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.1,
GROUND FLOOR, SRI LAVANYA SERENITY,
6TH MAIN, 13TH D CROSS, VENKTAPURA EXTN,
KORAMANGALA 1ST BLOCK,
BANGALORE - 560034

REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER
SRI. SHANKAR J.,
S/O LATE B JAYARAMA NAIDU,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/A NO.181, 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUT, 4TH SECTOR,
BENGALURU - 560102.

2. SRI. SHANKAR J.,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,

S/O LATE B JAYARAMA NAIDU,
R/A NO.181, 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUT, 4TH SECTOR,
BENGALURU - 560102.

3. SRI. RAVIKUMAR J.,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
S/O LATE B. JAYARAMA NAIDU,
R/A NO.181, 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUT, 4TH SECTOR,
BENGALURU- 560102.

4. SMT. PRIYADHARSHINI,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
W/O SRI. RAVIKUMAR J.,
R/A NO.181, 18TH MAIN,
HSR LAYOUT, 4TH SECTOR,
BENGALURU - 560102.

...PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SARAVANA S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY TO
THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560001.

2. THE SUB-REGISTRAR,
BANASAWADI,
BANGALORE EAST TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560043.

3. SRI. THULASIRAM S,
S/O LATE KRISHNA MANDADI SAPPANI,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
R/AT NO.1, GROUND FLOOR,
SRI LAVANYA SERENITY
6TH MAIN, 13TH 'D' CROSS,
VENKATAPURA EXTENSION,
KORAMANGALA 1ST BLOCK,
BENGALURU – 560034.

4. SRI. T. SUDHAKAR
S/O T. BHASKARA CHOWDHARY
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/A NO.406,
VANDANA PRIME ROSE APARTMENT,
YELUKUNTE VILLAGE,
HSR LAYOUT, 3RD SECTOR,
BENGALURU - 560102.

5. SRI. VASUDEVA REDDY
S/O V.C. THIPPA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
NO.59/29, 16TH CROSS
21ST MAIN, VANGALAHALLI WATER TANK
1ST SECTOR, HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU – 560 102.

6. SMT. V.RAMYA
S/O SRI NARASIMHA MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/AT DHANAMITTENAHALLI VILLAGE,
KONAPALLI POST
CHINTAMANI TALUK,
CHIKKABALLAPURA – 562101.

AND ALSO RESIDINT AT N0.203
SAMETHANAHALLIL,
THIRUMALASHETTYHALLI,
HOSAKOTE TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
BENGALURU – 562114.

7. SRI. PALA RAGHAVENDRA YADAV
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
S/O SRI PALA LAKSHMI NARASAIAH,
R/A FLAT NO.201
SSVS YADADRI TOWERS,
USHODAYA COLONY,
NEAR RAJAMANDRI SCHOOL
NIJJAMPET, TELANGANA – 500085.

...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. ADITYA DIWAKARA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI. RAJAGOPALA NAIDU, ADVOCATE FOR R3 & R4;
SRI M.S. HARINATH, ADVOCATE FOR R5 TO R7)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE REGISTRATION OF DOCUMENT NO. BNS-1-14478-2024-25, REGISTERED BEFORE THE SUB-REGISTRAR OFFICE BANASWADI, BANGALORE CAPTIONED AS DEED OF CANCELLATION OF SALE DEED DTD 12.11.2024 AS PER ANNX-M REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO. 2 AS PRESENTED BY RESPONDENTS NO.3 AND 4. AND ETC.

HC-KAR

CNR: KAHC010571062025

THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, **E.S. INDIRESH J.,** MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH

CAV ORDER

1. In W.P.No.26735/2025, the petitioners are assailing letter dated nil, in RRT/BE.CR/26/2025-06 (Annexure-L) passed by respondent No.2, M.R.No.T-156/2024-25(Annexure-G), M.R.No.T5/2025-26(Annexure-K),*inter-alia* sought for direction against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, for misuse and abuse of process of law in effecting mutation as per Annexures- G and K.

2. In W.P.No.53/2025, the petitioners have sought for quashing the registration of the document No.BNS-1-14478-2024-25(Annexure-M) dated 12.11.2024, captioned as 'Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed' registered before the respondent No.2, as presented by respondent Nos.3 and 4.

3. Since the facts and circumstances of the case are arising out of the Deed of Partnership dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-A) in respect of the subject matter of the land in question, Writ

Petitions were heard together and disposed of by this common order.

4. The relevant facts for adjudication of these Writ Petitions are that, in W.P.No.53/2025, the petitioner No.1 is a registered firm constituted as per the Partnership Deed dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-A). Thereafter, the Partnership was re-constituted and as such Deed of Reconstitution of Partnership dated 06.09.2022 (Annexure-C), wherein, the shares of the partners namely (i)Sri. Shankar J. having 50%, (ii) Sri. Ravikumar J. having 30%, (iii) Smt. Priyadharshini K. W/o Sri. Ravikumar J., having 14% and (iv) Sri. Thulasiram S. having 6%. It is further stated that, the petitioner – Firm had purchased land bearing Sy.No.198/3 (old Sy.No.198) measuring 1 acre 10 guntas duly converted under the Conversion Order dated 20.07.2021 as per the registered Sale Deed dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure-E). Thereafter, the revenue records transferred into the name of the petitioner – Firm. In the meanwhile, the petitioner – Firm had filed suit in O.S.No.911/2022 on the file of Prl. Civil Judge, Bengaluru Rural Court, against one Sri. Thrilokmoorthy and the same is pending consideration before

the Civil Court. It is further stated that, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 colluded with each other and as such, forged a letter of authorisation purportedly dated 31.07.2022 stating that the petitioner – Firm has authorised the respondent No.3 – Thulasiram S. to execute the Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed in respect of the subject land and accordingly, registered Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-M) has been registered before the respondent No.2. It is further stated that, criminal cases are pending consideration between the petitioners as well as respondent Nos.3 and 4 as to the dispute arising out of the affairs of the Partnership Firm. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No.2 has played mischief in becoming a party to admitting the registration of the document "Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed" and therefore, petitioners have presented W.P.No.53/2025 challenging the registration of document No.BNS-1-14478-2024-25 (Annexure-M).

5. In W.P.No.26735/2025, petitioners have challenged the letter addressed by the Assistant Commissioner to the Tahasildar as to change of khata in respect of the subject land,

and as such, assailing M.R.No.T-156, M.R.No.T5/2025-26 as per Annexures-G and K respectively.

6. Heard Sri. D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. Saravana S., learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. Aditya Diwakara, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondent – authorities in these Writ Petitions, Sri. Rajagopal Naidu and Sri. M.S. Harinath, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents.

7. Sri. D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended by referring to the Partnership Deed dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-A) that, the shares of the partners was modified by adding one more partner – Smt. Priyadharshini as per the Deed of Reconstitution of Partnership (Annexure-C). It is further argued that, the petitioner – Firm had purchased the schedule property as per registered Sale Deed dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure-E), whereby the then Partners have signed the registered Sale Deed. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that, one of the Partners – Thulasiram S., without the authority under law and

by forged resolution dated 31.07.2022 had executed the Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed dated 12.11.2024 in collusion with the erstwhile owner of the property (T. Sudhakar). Hence it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that, as there is no duly authorised resolution by all the Partners of the Firm and therefore, respondent No.2 ought not to have registered the Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed in terms of Section 32(c) of the Registration Act, 1908. In this regard, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners referred to the provision contained under Sections 14, 15, 18 and 19 of the Partnership Act, 1932. It is the categorical submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that, Section 33 of the Registration Act provides for types of the 'power of attorney' to be presented before the Registering Authority and the said power of attorney is mandated and imperative to be produced before the Registering Authority by an executant as to registering the document on behalf of the Partnership Firm and in the absence of such power of attorney duly executed by all the Partners to the Partnership Firm, the Registering Authority has no jurisdiction to accept the

document that may be produced by any person much less the partners to the firm and therefore, refers to the Order of this Court in W.P.No.28962/2015 and connected writ petitions disposed of 20.12.2024, particularly refers to paragraph Nos.33.4 to 33.7 therein. It is further argued that, the aforementioned order of the learned Single Judge of this Court was confirmed in W.A. No.310/2025 disposed of on 18.12.2025 and therefore, sought for interference of this Court.

8. Nextly it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the Writ Petitions are maintainable as to challenging the registered document as null and void on the ground that the respondent No.2 being a Registering Authority is carrying out an Administrative act in the performance of its statutory duties and same is amenable to Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in this regard, refers to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY (INDIA) LIMITED Vs. S.P. VELAYUTHAM AND OTHERS reported in (2022) 8 SCC 210 and argued that, under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the maintainability

of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so also the provision contained under Sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, and accordingly sought for interference of this Court.

9. Per contra, Sri. Rajagopala Naidu, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, submitted that, as disputed questions of fact are involved and the petitioners are seeking nullifying the registered instrument in the Writ Petition which is impermissible under law by this Court, and as such the petitioners have to approach the Civil Court for appropriate relief and this Court has no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in terms of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SATYA PAL ANAND Vs. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2016 SC 4995 and argued that the Writ Petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to the petitioners to approach the Civil Court.

10. It is further argued by Sri. Rajagopala Naidu, learned counsel, that the Deed of Cancellation of the Registered Sale Deed dated 12.11.2024 was executed based on the Resolution

dated 31.07.2022 made by the Partners to the petitioner – Firm and therefore, the said document cannot be doubted as to the genuineness of its registration and in this regard, refers to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of SMT. MADHAVI Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS in W.A.No.4831/2017 disposed of on 23.12.2021, and argued that the Writ Petitions deserve to be dismissed as the aggrieved party has to approach the Civil Court by filing a comprehensive suit which requires a detailed enquiry and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the Writ Petitions.

11. It is further argued by Sri. Rajagopala Naidu, learned counsel, by referring to Clause 17 of the Partnership Deed dated 18.12.2021 (Annexure-A) that a provision has been made for resolution of dispute by an Arbitrator and therefore, sought for relegating the parties before Arbitration proceedings. It is further argued that the respondent No.3 (Thulasiram S.) has filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before this Court and same is pending consideration and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. Finally it is argued that, the

entire consideration with regard to purchase of schedule property as per the registered Sale Deed dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure-E) was paid by Shankar J. (petitioner No.2) and not by the Partnership Firm and therefore, contended that the Writ Petitions deserve to be dismissed on the aforementioned grounds/counts.

12. Sri. Aditya Diwakara, learned Additional Government Advocate sought to justify the impugned registered documents.

13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the following points are required to be answered in these Writ Petitions:

(i) Whether the Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable assailing the registered document namely "Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed" dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-M), executed by the respondent No.3 – Thulasiram S.?

(ii) Whether the registration of Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed is contrary to Section 32 of the Registration Act, 1908?

14. It is pertinent to mention here that, the petitioner No.1 is a Partnership Firm as per the Deed of Partnership dated 18.12.2021 consisting of three partners namely, petitioners No.2, 3 and respondent No.3 – Thulasiram S., and thereafter, Deed of Reconstitution of Partnership dated 06.09.2022 wherein one more partner – petitioner No.4, was added specifying their capital contribution and profit and loss sharing ratio as per Clause 5 to the Annexure-C. It is not in dispute that the petitioner No.1 – Firm had purchased the schedule property as per registered Sale Deed dated 18.01.2022 and all the original three partners were signatories to the registered Sale Deed dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure-E). The dispute arises between the parties on account of execution of Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-M), wherein, the respondent No.3 herein, placing the resolution dated 31.07.2022 by the remaining partners of the petitioner No.1 – Firm executed the Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed at

Annexure-M with the vendor of the schedule property (respondent No.4 – T. Sudhakar).

15. In the light of the aforementioned aspects as to the cancellation of the registered instrument under similar circumstances had come up before this Court in W.P.No.28962/2015 and connected Writ Petitions disposed of on 20.12.2024, this Court at para 33.4 to 33.9 held as follows:

> " 33.4. Before registering any document, the said document would have to be perused, examined and ascertained if the requirement of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and the requirement of the Karnataka Registration Rules, 1965 are complied with or not. It is not that any document placed before the Sub-registrar will be registered blindly. It is only if compliance is made of the requirement of the Act and Rules that the document will proceed for registration. A Sub-Registrar could not have allowed registration of a document which has nearly 40 pages of extracts of judgments and has been unilaterally made by one person. Any document to be registered in Book 1 is required to be related to the title of the property, an unilateral declaration made by Dr.Senthilnathan could not have been registered in Book-1. A unilateral declaration has been made by him that he has cleared

the loans of IOB and No Due Certificate has been issued by IOB, there is no law which permits such a declaration in Book 1. A declaration has been made that there is collusion between IOB and ARCIL in executing various documents which is a self-serving statement which again could not be registered in Book 1. Again a unilateral declaration has been made that ARCIL has played fraud, practised coercion and suppressed before the Courts various aspects if at all there is any grievance it was for Sridevi or Dr Senthilnathan to have agitated the same before a court of competent jurisdiction. Any document which is registered by a sub-registrar in Book 1 would also be reflected in the encumbrance certificate and there credibility attached to such a registered document. The manner in which the registration of such a declaratory affidavit in Book 1 has been made clearly and categorically indicates collusion between Dr. Senthilnathan and the sub-registrar, the actions on part of the sub-registrar are beyond his official powers and the said document has been registered contrary to the applicable law.

33.5. The unilateral cancellation of the Assignment Agreement between IOB and ARCIL could not also have been registered in Book-1 finding an entry in the encumbrance certificate and based on the same, the Sub-Registrar could not have held that the title of Dr.Senthilnathan and/or Sridevi was clear and

marketable, for the same reasons aforesaid. A document can be cancelled by parties to the document and not by unilaterally registering and cancellation deed. If a document is registered it can be cancelled by the parties to the said document registering a cancellation deed to by obtaining a decree from a competent court cancelling the agreement. In this case an unregistered Agreement between IOB and Arcil is cancelled by Dr. Senthilanathan, when he is not even a party to the said agreement, the least that a sub-registrar is required to do is to verify the parties to the document, which has also not been done.

33.6. The Sub-Registrar, it is clear has acted beyond his powers and, in fact, has abdicated all his duties while registering both the above documents, it is therefore required that an enquiry is held in this regard.

33.7. A document can be cancelled either by an order of the Court or by all the parties coming together and executing a document, so long as no further document has been executed in furtherance thereof.

33.8. Thus, I answer Point No.1 by holding that a unilateral declaration could not have been executed by a person and registered in Book-1 by a Sub-Registrar.

> 33.9. I answer Point No.2 by holding that a unilateral cancellation agreement could not be executed and registered by a party who is not a party to a document, let alone be registered by a Sub-Registrar."

16. The aforementioned Order of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court was confirmed in W.A.No.310/2025 by Judgment dated 18.12.2025, and it is relevant to extract paragraph Nos.22 to 25 of the said Judgment, which is noted below:

> "22. There is also no discussion whatsoever as to how the Anti-Corruption Council of India had obtained any such instrument. No notice was issued to the ARCIL regarding any such proceedings. Prima facie, the office of the Senior Sub-Registrar has been misused for generating the said letter. The learned Single Judge had rightly held that the said order passed under Section 33 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 is ex facie void as having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice.
>
> 23. As noted above, appellant No.2 had unilaterally executed deeds for cancelling agreements of assignment, to which it was not a party. We are loss to understand as to how a third party could cancel an agreement between two other parties. However, the Senior Sub-Registrar willingly lent assistance and

registering such unilateral documents (declaration and cancellation). Copies of these documents are placed on record. The deed of declaration dated 03.10.2016, is a document spanning 58 pages and most of it are extracts of reported decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and other courts. Appellant No.2 has unilaterally declared that the ARCIL had played a fraud on court and other authorities and the Assignment Agreement dated 31.08.2010, which was executed and registered with the Senior Sub-Registrar, is null and void.

24. It is disconcerting to note that the Senior Sub-Registrar not only registered the document, but also acted on the said basis and issued a certificate dated 09.10.2014 certifying that the subject property was free from encumbrances.

25. We do not find any infirmity with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The contention that it would adversely affect the appellants in pending civil proceedings is a necessary consequence of founding an action on the basis of such documents. In the given facts, the contention that the ARCIL had an alternative remedy and therefore, the writ petition could not have been entertained is unpersuasive. It is well settled that existence of an alternate remedy does not denude this Court of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However,

existence of an alternate remedy in normal circumstances is a ground for the High Court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction."

17. Sri. M.S. Harinath, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents, referred to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SATYA PAL ANAND (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the provision contained under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act read with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, holding that the right and title through a registered document has to be decided by the Civil Court in a comprehensive civil suit and not by writ petition. However the competency of the Registrar to accept the document for registration as per Sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act was not considered in the aforementioned Judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the private respondents. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ASSET RECONSTRUCTION COMPANY (INDIA) LIMITED (supra) had an occasion to consider identical factual scenario and paragraph Nos. 14 to 20 and 40 to 61 reads as under:

"14. Section 32 of the Act mandates that every document to be registered under the Act, irrespective of whether such a registration is compulsory or optional, shall be presented by any of the persons mentioned therein. Section 32 reads as follows:

> "32. Persons to present documents for registration.— Except in the cases mentioned in sections 31, 88 and 89, every document, to be registered under this Act, whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the proper registration office,—
>
> (a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, in the case of a copy of a decree or order, claiming under the decree or order, or
>
> (b) by the representative or assign of such a person, or
>
> (c) by the agent of such a person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power of attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned."

15. The words "such person" appearing in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 32, correlate to the words "person executing or claiming under the same", appearing in clause (a) of Section 32. In other words, clause (a) covers both the executant as well as the claimant of the document. Therefore, clauses (b) and (c) cover several persons who may represent the executant or the claimant. Since the controversy in several decisions of this Court has revolved around clause (c) of Section 32, it would be useful, for the purpose of easy appreciation, to break clause (c) into its several components as follows:

(i) by the agent of the person executing the document;

(ii) by the agent of the person claiming under the document;

(iii) by the agent of the representative of the person executing the document;

(iv) by the agent of the representative of the person claiming under the document;

(v) by the agent of the assign of the person executing the document;

(vi) by the agent of the assign claiming under the document.

16. It must be noted that the word "agent" appearing in clause (c) of section 32 goes not only with the words "such a person", but also with the words "representative" and "assign". This is for the reason that 'representative' and 'assign' are independently covered by clause (b) and hence if these words do not go with the word 'agent' th en their appearance in clause (c) would be redundant.

17. By virtue of the 2nd part of clause (c) of Section 32, it is necessary that if a document for registration is presented by any of the afore mentioned six categories of persons, he should have been "duly authorized by a PoA executed and authenticated in the manner mentioned in the other provisions of the Act". In other words, in cases where a document is presented for registration by the agent, (i) of the executant; or (ii) of the claimant; or (iii) of the representative or assign of the executant or claimant, the same cannot be accepted for registration unless the agent is duly authorized by a PoA executed and authenticated in the manner provided in the Act.

18. Section 33 contains prescriptions regarding the types of PoA, which alone shall be recognized, for the purposes of Section 32. Section 33 reads as follows:

33. Power of attorney recognizable for purposes of section 32.—(l) For the purposes of section 32, the following powers of attorney shall alone be recognized, namely:—

(a) if the principal at the time of executing the power of - attorney resides in any part of India in which this Act is for the time being in force, a power of attorney executed

before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub Registrar within whose district or sub district the principal resides;

(b) if the principal at the time aforesaid resides in any part of India in which this Act is not in force, a power of - attorney executed before and authenticated by any Magistrate;

(c) if the principal at the time aforesaid does not reside in India, a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice Consul, or representative of the Central Government:

Provided that the following persons shall not be required to attend at any registration office or Court for the purpose of executing any such power of attorney as is mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of this section, namely:—

(i) persons who by reason of bodily infirmity are unable without risk or serious inconvenience so to attend;

(ii) persons who are in jail under civil or criminal process; and

(iii) persons exempt by law from personal appearance in Court.

(2) In the case of every such person the Registrar or Sub Registrar or Magistrate, as the case may be, if satisfied that the power of attorney has been voluntarily executed by the person purporting to be the principal, may attest the same without requiring his personal attendance at the office or Court aforesaid.

(3) To obtain evidence as to the voluntary nature of the execution, the Registrar or Sub Registrar or Magistrate may either himself go to the house of the person purporting to be the principal, or to the jail in which he is confined, and examine him, or issue a commission for his examination.

(4) Any power of attorney mentioned in this section may be proved by the production of it without further proof when it purports on the face of it to have been executed before and authenticated by the person or Court hereinbefore mentioned in that behalf."

19. A careful look at Sections 32 and 33 will show that while speaking about PoA, these provisions do not use the word "registration". While Section 32(c) uses the words "executed and authenticated", Section 33(1) uses the words "recognised" and "authenticated". Therefore it is clear that the word "authenticated" is not to be understood to be the same as "registered". The reason why we say so is that Section 33(1) speaks only about authentication and not registration and clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 33(1) provides the list of persons competent to authenticate a PoA. Persons who are empowered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub section (1) of Section 33 to authenticate a PoA are as follows:

19.1 The Registrar or the Sub Registrar within whose district or sub district the principal resides, if such principal resides, at the time of execution of the PoA, in any part of India to which this Act applies;

19.2 Any Magistrate, if the principal resides in any part of India where this Act is not in force;

19.3 A Notary Public, any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul, Vice Consul or Representative of the Central Government, if the principal does not reside in India.

20. It may be seen from the list of persons indicated above, that not all of them are Registrars and SubRegistrars appointed in terms of Section 6 of the Registration Act, 1908. Under the Act, the power of registration is conferred only upon the Registrars and Sub Registrars appointed under the Act. But clauses (b) & (c) of Section 33(1) speaks about persons other than Registrars and Sub-Registrars. This is why, Section 32(c) as well as Section 33 use only the expression "authenticated" and not the word "registered". But unfortunately several Courts have mixedup these two words, resulting in applying the test in terms of Sections 17 and 18 for determining the validity of a PoA.

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40. Therefore, if the Registering Officer had verified the recitals contained in the registered deed of PoA dated 23.08.2006, to see if the power agent had the power to do what he did, he would have refused the registration of the document. Rule 46 of the Tamilnadu Registration Rules ordains what the Registering Officer is obliged to do,

(i) when a document is presented for registration under a special PoA; and (ii) when a document is presented for registration under a general PoA.

It was the failure on the part of the Registering Officer to do what he is required to do, that convinced the learned Single Judge to invoke the writ jurisdiction. But the Division Bench overturned the decision of the learned Judge on the ground that the writ court ought to have relegated the parties to the civil court.

41. Two main contentions are raised on behalf of the contesting respondents, namely (i) the restraint that is expected of the High Court, in a writ petition arising under Article 226, in respect of matters which require detailed factual investigation; and (ii) the limited scope of the enquiry that could be conducted by the Registering Authority under Sections 32 to 34 of the Registration Act, 1908.

42. In support of the first contention, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon the following decisions, (i) Thansingh Nathmal vs. Superintendent of Taxes, (ii) Sarvepalli Ramaiah vs. District Collector; (iii) Latif Estate Line India Ltd. vs. Hadeeja Ammal.

43. Out of the aforesaid decisions, the decision in Thansingh (supra) arose out of the orders of assessment passed under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. The order passed by the original authority was challenged before the appellate authority and then the revisional authority and thereafter in a writ petition under Article 226. It was in such circumstances that this Court held that the High Court had no power to decide questions of fact which are exclusively within the competence of the taxing authorities. Similarly, the decision

in Sarvepalli Ramaiah (supra), arose out of proceedings for the grant of Ryotwari Patta. The dispute travelled to the High Court after an elaborate enquiry by the District Collector. It was in that context that this Court examined the scope of the power of judicial review under Article 226.

44. The Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Latif Estate Line India Ltd. (supra), arose out of a controversy as to whether a deed of cancellation of sale can or cannot be accepted for registration. The Full Bench explained the circumstances under which a deed of cancellation, presented by both the vendor and the purchaser, can be accepted. But the Full Bench categorically held that a deed of unilateral cancellation cannot even be accepted for registration. This proposition actually goes in support of the contention of the appellant that the Registering Officer has a duty to see whether the document presented for registration has been presented in accordance with law or not. In fact the decision of the Full Bench itself arose out of a writ petition challenging the act of the Registering Authority in allowing the registration of the deeds of unilateral cancellation of sale deeds.

45. The reliance placed by the respondents on the decision in Satya Pal Anand vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, is misplaced. The decision in Satya Pal Anand (supra) arose out a case where the allotment of a plot made by a cooperative society was cancelled unilaterally by a deed of extinguishment, by the society. The allottee raised a dispute which ended in a compromise but notwithstanding the compromise the allottee raised a dispute under the relevant provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. When the dispute was pending, the allottee moved the Registering Officer for the cancellation of the deed of transfer executed in favour of the subsequent purchasers. When the Registering Authority refused to comply with the demand, a writ petition was moved seeking a declaration that the deed of extinguishment and the subsequent sales were null and void. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that a dispute was already pending before the competent authority under the Cooperative Societies Act. When the order of dismissal passed by the High Court was challenged before this Court,

there was a difference of opinion as to whether the issue was directly covered by the decision of this Court in Thota Ganga Laxmi and Another vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others. Therefore, the matter was placed before a three Judge Bench. While upholding the decision of the High Court, the three member Bench held in Satya Pal Anand (supra) that there was no rule in the State of Madhya Pradesh similar to Rule 26(k)(i) of the Rules issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 and that therefore the decision in Thota Ganga Laxmi (supra) cannot be invoked.

46. The decision in Satya Pal Anand (supra) cannot go to the rescue of the contesting respondents, for the simple reason that the writ petitioner in that case, first accepted a compromise and then raised a dispute under the Cooperative Societies Act (which is akin to a civil suit) and thereafter approached the High Court under Article 226 for a declaration, which he could have sought only in the already instituted proceedings. The very fact that Thota Ganga Laxmi was sought to be distinguished on the basis of the express provision contained in the Rules of the State of A.P., would indicate that there is no absolute bar for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226.

47. Both sides relied upon the decision of this Court in Rajni Tandon (supra). The question that arose in Rajni Tandon (supra) was as to whether the PoA required authentication by the Registering Authority, when a sale deed executed by the power agent himself is presented for registration by the power agent. This question was couched in a different language by this Court in paragraph 19 of the Report in Rajni Tandon (supra) as follows:

> "19. In view of the aforesaid situation, the issue that falls for our consideration is whether a person who executes a document under the terms of the power of attorney, is, insofar as the registration office is concerned, the actual executant of the document and is entitled under Section 32(a) to present it for registration and get it registered."

48. After analysing Sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, 1908 this Court came to the conclusion that whenever

an agent is authorised to execute a document and present the same for registration and he accordingly executes the document in terms of PoA, he becomes the actual executant in so far as the Registering Authority is concerned and that therefore he becomes entitled under Section 33(a) to present it for registration. This Court further held that the authentication in terms of Section 33(1)(a) is required only in cases where Section 32(c) is invoked. Paragraph 33 of the Report in Rajni Tandon is reproduced for easy appreciation as follows:

> "33. Where a deed is executed by an agent for a principal and the same agent signs, appears and presents the deed or admits execution before the registering officer, that is not a case of presentation under Section 32(c) of the Act. As mentioned earlier the provisions of Section 33 will come into play only in cases where presentation is in terms of Section 32(c) of the Act. In other words, only in cases where the person(s) signing the document cannot present the document before the registering officer and gives a power of attorney to another to present the document that the provisions of Section 33 get attracted. It is only in such a case, that the said power of attorney has to be necessarily executed and authenticated in the manner provided under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act."

49. But we are not concerned in this case with the question whether the PoA relied upon by the power agent S.P. Velayutham in the sale deed executed by him, required authentication and whether the Registering Authority committed a blunder in accepting the sale deed presented by him for registration, without verifying the authentication of the PoA or not. We are concerned in this case with the most fundamental question whether the Registering Authority could have turned a blind eye to the fact that the deed of PoA on the basis of which the sale deed was executed as well as presented for registration by S.P. Velayutham contained an express prohibition for the power agent to create an encumbrance on the property, especially in the light of the Rules framed under section 69 of the Act. The decision in Thota Ganga Laxmi, was in a way approved by a 3member Bench in Satya Pal Anand, on the basis of the rules in the State of Andhra Pradesh, showing thereby that

statutory rules also play a crucial role. Rajni Tandon is not an authority for holding that the registering Authority has no duty even to verify the presence or absence of a power of sale in the deed of PoA, especially in the light of the rules.

50. In Amar Nath vs. Gian Chand, this Court was concerned with a case arising out of peculiar circumstances. The said case arose out of a civil suit for a declaration of title and for permanent injunction. The plaintiff in that case entered into an oral agreement for the sale of his property and gave a special PoA in favour of the second defendant. But the agreement fell through and hence the plaintiff took back the original deed of PoA from the second defendant. However, the second defendant applied for a copy of the PoA and thereafter sold the property in collusion with the first defendant. Upon coming to know of the same, the original owner filed the suit as aforesaid, contending that the second defendant had no valid power and that the Registering Authority ought to have verified this aspect from the second defendant under Sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Registration Act, 1908. After trial, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the cancellation of the PoA also required registration and that the mere writing of the word “cancelled” on the original PoA cannot be taken to mean that the power was validly cancelled. The First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. While reversing the judgments of the trial court and the Appellate Court, the High Court opined that under Section 18A of the Registration Act as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh, by way of an amendment under Himachal Pradesh Act 2 of 1969, the PoA ought to have accompanied the sale deed presented for registration and that if the Sub Registrar had ensured this, he would have found that in view of the cancellation of the power, the agent ceased to have any power of sale.

51. This decision of the High Court was reversed by this Court in Amar Nath (supra), after an exhaustive analysis of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. While doing so, this Court held in paragraph 40 as follows:

> “40. For reasons, which we have indicated, Section 32(c) read with Section 33 and Section 34(2)(c) are inter

related and they would have no application in regard to the document presented for registration by a power of attorney holder who is also the executant of the document. In other words, there is really no need for the production of the original power of attorney, when the document is presented for registration by the person standing in the shoes of the second defendant in this case as he would be covered by the provisions of Section 32(a) as he has executed the document though on the strength of the power of attorney. To make it even further clear, the inquiry contemplated under the Registration Act, cannot extend to question as to whether the person who executed the document in his capacity of the power of attorney holder of the principal, was indeed having a valid power of attorney or not to execute the document or not.."

52. Though the passage extracted above, lends credence to the contention of the learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents, there is some difficulty in accepting the same as a proposition of law of universal application. There are two reasons why we say so. They are:

(i) as we have stated elsewhere, the interpretation of the provisions of the Registration Act, would depend upon the State amendments and the Rules framed in each State under Section 69; and

(ii) in Amar Nath, the challenge to the sale was before the civil court, not merely on the ground that the Registering Authority failed to perform his duties, but also on the ground that the defendant conveyed what he could not have.

Unfortunately, the parties in Amar Nath, appear to have gone on a wild goose chase. Instead of focussing their attack on the agent (who was the defendant in the suit), for executing the document without any power, the parties focussed their attack on the registering officer for permitting the registration of the document. This resulted in their failure. If a civil court finds that the sale by a power agent was unauthorised, then the question whether the Registering Officer performed his duties properly or not, would lose its significance. An attack

on the authority of the executant of a document, is not to be mixed with the attack on the authority of the Registering Officer to register the document. The distinction between the execution of a document and the registration of the document is to be borne in mind while dealing with these questions.

53. Actually, the registration of a document comprises of three essential steps among others.

They are,

(i) execution of the document, by the executant signing or affixing his left hand thumb impression;

(ii) presenting the document for registration and admitting to the Registering Authority the execution of such document; and

(iii) the act of registration of the document.

54. In cases where a suit for title is filed, with or without the relief of declaration that the registered document is null and void, what gets challenged, is a combination of all the aforesaid three steps in the process of execution and registration. The first of the aforesaid three steps may be challenged in a suit for declaration that the registered document is null and void, either on the ground that the executant did not have a valid title to pass on or on the ground that what was found in the document was not the signature of the executant or on the ground that the signature of the executant was obtained by fraud, coercion etc. The second step of presentation of the document and admitting the execution of the same, may also be challenged on the very same grounds hereinabove stated. Such objections to the first and second of the aforesaid three steps are substantial and they strike at the very root of creation of the document. A challenge to the very execution of a document, is a challenge to its very DNA and any defect or illegality on the execution, is congenital in nature. Therefore,

such a challenge, by its very nature, has to be made only before the civil court and certainly not before the writ court.

55. The third step namely the act of registration, is something that the Registering Authority is called upon to do statutorily. While the executant of the document and the person claiming under the document (claimant) are the only actors involved in the first two steps, the Registering Officer is the actor in the third step. Apart from the third step which is wholly in the domain of the Registering Authority, he may also have a role to play in the second step when a document is presented for registration and the execution thereof is admitted. The role that is assigned to the Registrar in the second step is that of verification of the identity of the person presenting the document for registration.

56. Thus, the first two steps in the process of registration are substantial in nature, with the parties to the document playing the role of the lead actors and the Registering Authority playing a guest role in the second step. The third step is procedural in nature where the Registering Authority is the lead actor.

57. In suits for declaration of title and/or suits for declaration that a registered document is null and void, all the aforesaid three steps which comprise the entire process of execution and registration come under challenge. If a party questions the very execution of a document or the right and title of a person to execute a document and present it for registration, his remedy will only be to go to the civil court. But where a party questions only the failure of the Registering Authority to perform his statutory duties in the course of the third step, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 stands completely ousted. This is for the reason that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is to ensure that statutory authorities perform their duties within the bounds of law.

58. It must be noted that when a High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 finds that there was utter failure on the part of the Registering Authority to stick to the mandate of law, the Court merely cancels the act of registration, but does not declare the very execution of the

document to be null and void. A declaration that a document is null and void, is exclusively within the domain of the civil court, but it does not mean that the High Court cannot examine the question whether or not the Registering Authority performed his statutory duties in the manner prescribed by law.

59. It is well settled that if something is required by law to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done only in that manner and not otherwise. Examining whether the Registering Authority did something in the manner required by law or otherwise, is certainly within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. However, it is needless to say that the High Courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction in cases where the violations of procedure on the part of the Registering Authority are not gross or the violations do not shock the conscience of the Court. Lack of jurisdiction is completely different from a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.

60. In the case on hand, the appellant has not sought a declaration from the High Court that the execution of the document in question was null and void or that there was no title for the executant to transfer the property. The appellant assailed before the High Court, only the act of omission on the part of the Registering Authority to check up whether the person who claimed to be the power agent, had the power of conveyance and the power of presenting the document for registration, especially in the light to the statutory rules. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly applied the law and allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant, but the Division Bench got carried away by the sound and fury created by the contesting respondents on the basis of

(i) pendency of the civil suits;

(ii) findings recorded by the Special Court for CBI cases; and

(iii) the order passed by this Court in the SLP arising out of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.

61. Arguments were advanced on the question whether the Registering Authority is carrying out an administrative act or a quasi judicial act in the performance of his statutory duties.

> But we think it is not relevant for determining the availability of writ jurisdiction. If the Registering Authority is found to be exercising a quasi judicial power, the exercise of such a power will still be amenable to judicial review under Article 226, subject to the exhaustion of the remedies statutorily available. On the contrary if the Registering Authority is found to be performing only an administrative act, even then the High Court is empowered to see whether he performed the duties statutorily ordained upon him in the manner prescribed by law."

18. In the aforementioned Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the decision in SATYA PAL ANAND case, however, while interpreting Section 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, has held that, whenever an agent is authorised to execute a document and present the same for registration and accordingly, executes the document in terms of the power of attorney and thereafter, such person becomes the actual executant in so far as the registering authority is concerned. Hon'ble Supreme Court in unequivocal terms has held that, there must be a power of attorney by the remaining partners of the partnership firm required for the registration of the document. Taking into consideration the finding recorded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in the aforementioned decisions, I am of the view that, a document

can be cancelled by all the parties to the original document and not by unilaterally registering and cancellation of such deed unless by one or a few of the executants and there must be a power of attorney by the executants of the original registered instrument, authorising the agent to cancel the earlier deed. Taking into consideration the aforementioned aspects and on careful consideration of the Deed of Cancellation of Sale deed dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-M) which has been unilaterally executed by respondent No.3 – Thulasiram S. in favour of respondent No.4 – T. Sudhakar, in the absence of the remaining partners namely petitioner Nos.2 and 3, I am of the view that the respondent No.2 has misused its powers under the Registration Act and in connivance with the respondent No.3 had executed the Deed of cancellation of Sale Deed at Annexure-M without duly registered power of attorney by the remaining partners and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that, it is an arbitrary exercise of power by respondent No.2 to execute the Deed of cancellation of sale deed at Annexure-M.

19. I have also noted that this Court, normally will not interfere with the cancellation of registered instruments,

however, in the present case, as the execution of Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed at Annexure-M was registered contrary to Section 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, and therefore, in all practical purposes, the aforementioned Deed at Annexure-M is nullity in law and therefore, it is expedient to exercise the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to nullify the aforementioned document at Annexure-M. Hence, the points for consideration referred to above are subject to the result of the order that may be passed in the pending Civil Miscellaneous Petition by this Court, in view of providing Arbitration Clause in the Partnership Deed (Annexure-A).

20. In the result, I pass the following:

ORDER

(i) Writ petitions are allowed.

(ii) The registration of document No. No.BNS-1-14478-2024-25 registered before the respondent No.2 dated 12.11.2025, as Deed of Cancellation of Sale Deed dated 12.11.2024 (Annexure-M) is accordingly, cancelled as null and

void subject to the result of the order that may be passed in the pending Civil Miscellaneous Petition by this Court, in view of providing Arbitration Clause in the Partnership Deed (Annexure-A).

(iii) The letter dated nil vide No.RRT/BE.CR/26/2025-26 by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub Division is accordingly set aside and direction is issued to the Tahsildar, K.R. Pura East Taluk, to enter the name of petitioner No.1 – Firm in the revenue records in respect of the subject land.

SD/-
(E.S.INDIRESH)
JUDGE

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List No.: 1 Sl No.: 49