

BEFORE THE TAMIL NADU REAL ESTATE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
(TNREAT)

(Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Andaman & Nicobar Islands)

Under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

Reserved on: 24.06.2026

Delivered on: 01.07.2026

Coram : Hon'ble Mr.Justice M.Duraiswamy, Chairperson
Mr.K.Babu, Judicial Member

Appeal No.27 of 2026
and
M.A.No.86 of 2026

1. Thecla Gnanam Benjamin
2. M.K. Vijaya Anand

... Appellants

Vs.

M/s.Prestige Estate Projects Ltd.
rep. by its Head Business Operation - TN

... Respondent

Appeal has been filed under Section 44 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 to set aside the order dated 29.10.2025 in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 passed by the learned Adjudicating Officer, Tamil Nadu Real Estate Regulatory Authority (TNRERA) Chennai and allow the complaint in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 and to direct the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs only) together with 10% interest per annum till the date of actual payment towards compensation.

For Appellants : Mr.A.Umapathy

For Respondent : Mr.S.Arjun Suresh

ORDER

Challenging the order passed in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 dated 29.10.2025 on the file of the learned Adjudicating Officer, Tamil Nadu Real Estate Regulatory Authority (TNRERA), the complainants have filed the above appeal.

2. The complainants filed the complaint claiming compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- together with interest @ 10% p.a. for having made false promises, non-availability of Completion Certificate, unfair trade practices and gross deficiency of services, mental tribulations and costs.

3. The appellants/complainants are allottees of a residential Apartment bearing No.1077 situated in the 6th Floor of Tower-1 (T1) in the project “Prestige Bella Vista” developed by the respondent at Iyyappanthangal Village, Chennai. The cost of the said apartment was Rs.83,58,240/-. On 03.10.2014, a registered Construction Agreement was entered into between the appellants/complainants and the respondent. The area of the 2BHK apartment is 1166 sq. ft. along with undivided share of land measuring an extent of 302.15 sq. ft. As per the Construction Agreement, the respondent undertook to complete the construction and hand over possession of the Apartment on or before 31.03.2015 with a grace period of six months (i.e.) on or before 30.09.2015, after obtaining all statutory approvals, including Completion Certificate. On 22.05.2015, a registered Sale Deed was executed after the appellants/complainants paid the entire Sale Consideration. Contrary to the Construction Agreement, the respondent did not hand over the possession by 31.03.2015 or even within the grace period ending on

30.09.2015, thereby, committing breach of the Agreement. Only on 10.02.2016, the respondent issued a letter calling upon the appellants/complainants to take possession and the same was handed over on the same date without the Completion Certificate. Due to the delay in handing over of possession, the appellants/complainants filed C.C.No.66 of 2017 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai (South). Owing to the non-availability of the Completion Certificate, the appellants/complainants were put to hardship. Electricity Service Connection was denied by the TANGEDCO due to absence of Completion Certificate. Hence, the appellants/complainants filed the complaint before the learned Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA.

4. The respondent/promoter, in their counter, have stated that the project has not been registered under Section 3 of the RERA Act and the Apartment was handed over to the appellants/complainants on 10.02.2016. Being in possession and occupation for more than 8 years, the appellants/complainants have filed the complaint only on 28.12.2022 (i.e.) after 8 years, which is barred by limitation and that any claim for compensation due to the delay in handing over possession should have been filed within 3 years from the date of cause of action i.e. from 01.10.2015. Moreover, in the Construction Agreement there is a Clause for Arbitration. Hence, present complaint is not maintainable as parties had agreed to refer all disputes arising out of the Construction Agreement to the Arbitration. Moreover, the delay in obtaining the Completion Certificate from the CMDA is due to the reason that the CMDA raised a demand of Rs.53.10 Crores towards

developmental charges and infrastructure and amenities charges. Subsequently, raised a revised demand of Rs.95 Crores claiming additional payment towards infrastructure and amenities charges . The same was challenged by way of filing Writ Petitions before the Hon'ble Madras High Court in W.P.Nos.25677 and 25678 of 2012. Aggrieved over the order passed in the Writ Petitions, CMDA filed Writ Appeals in W.A.Nos.147 & 148 of 2013 which the same were dismissed, against which the CMDA preferred Special Leave Petitions in S.L.P.Nos.5642 and 5643 of 2019 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. After completion of those proceedings, the respondent/promoter was constrained to pay revised demand along with interest and the same was paid by the respondent/promoter. Therefore, the respondent/promoter, in no manner, was liable for the delay in issuance of Completion Certificate. The delay, if any, is only due to the bonafide attempt of the respondent/promoter to exhaust all legal remedies to challenge the revised demand. Moreover, the appellants/complainants already filed a complaint in C.C.No.66 of 2017 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking compensation for the delay in handing over of the Apartment. The Commission also awarded a sum of Rs.2,41,816/- towards compensation for the delay in delivering the possession of the Apartment. Hence, the present complaint is not maintainable since the same issue for the same cause of action between the same parties has been heard and finally decided. The order passed by the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission operates as *res judicata* for this complaint.

5. Heard Mr.A.Umapathy, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/complainants and Mr.S.Arjun Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

6. Before the Adjudicating Officer, the 2nd complainant was examined as C.W.1. and 14 documents, Exs.A1 to A14 were marked. On the side of the respondent, the respondent was examined as R.W.1 and 8 documents, Exs.B1 to B8 were marked.

7. The Adjudicating Officer, by her order dated 29.10.2025, dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation finding that the appellants/complainants filed the complaint beyond the period of three years prescribed under Article 27 of the Limitation Act. While dismissing the complaint, the Adjudicating Officer has also stated that the cause of action for filing the complaint arose on 01.10.2015. Challenging this order, the complainant has filed the above appeal.

8. Mr.A.Umpathay, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the Adjudicating Officer had erroneously dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation when the complaint filed by the appellants is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in **(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]**, the complaint filed before the Adjudicating Officer is clearly barred by limitation

under Article 27 of the Limitation Act and was rightly dismissed by the Adjudicating Officer. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

10. On a careful consideration of the materials available on record and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, it could be seen that the main issues that arise for consideration in this appeal are whether the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act and whether the complaint filed by the complainants is barred by limitation.

11. It is not in dispute that the appellants/complainants entered into a Construction Agreement on 03.10.2014 and registered on 08.08.2015 and an Agreement of Sale was entered on 22.05.2015 and registered on 06.12.2015. In the Construction Agreement, the respondent promised to handover the Apartment on or before 31.03.2015 with a grace period of 6 months (i.e.) on or before 30.09.2015. The appellants/complainants filed the complaint in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 before the Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA only on 28.12.2022. The Adjudicating Officer dismissed the complaint on the ground of limitation finding that the appellants/complainants filed the complaint beyond the period of three years prescribed under Article 27 of the Limitation Act. While dismissing the complaint, the Adjudicating Officer has also stated that the cause of action for filing the complaint arose on 30.09.2015.

12. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in **(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]**, cited supra, the Apex court had discussed the powers of the Company Law Board to condone the delay under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. The findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the conclusion in the said judgment are only with regard to the scope of the applicability of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies. In the said judgment, except Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, the other provisions of the Limitation Act did not arise for consideration. The determination of the complaint filed before the RERA as time barred is as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Section 3 of the Limitation Act deals with "bar of limitation". Section 3 clarifies that, subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

13. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the main issue that arose for consideration was whether the condonation of delay under Section 5 can be invoked by the quasi-judicial body, which is governed by special legislation. The Apex Court found that if the special legislation prescribes any time limit for filing an appeal and an outer limit for condoning any delay, then such a timeline shall be strictly followed without following Section 5 to condone such delay. In the said judgment, the Apex Court only dealt with the application of law of limitation to the specific provision of applying Section 5 and it has not ousted the entire

applicability of Limitation Act to the claims before the quasi-judicial bodies. The bar of limitation under Section 3 remains unaffected by the said judgment.

14. On a further reading of the judgment of the Apex Court, it could be seen that the issue involved in the said case was that whether the CLB, being a quasi-judicial body, could be said to have the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013. In other words, even if Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, *per se*, could not be applied to quasi-judicial bodies, whether the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 be made applicable to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 instituted before the Company Law Board? In the said case, the respondent therein applied for registration of transmission of shares to the appellant Company, which was refused by the appellant on 30.04.2013. At that time, Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 was applicable. Later, Act 2013 was implemented and Sections 58 & 59 relating to the subject came into force. An appeal under Section 58 was filed before the CLB challenging the registration of transmission of shares with an application to condone the delay of 249 days in preferring the said appeal. The CLB condoned the delay. Aggrieved over the same, an appeal was preferred before the Calcutta High Court and the High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of CLB. On appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Apex Court held that CLB, being a quasi-judicial body, has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal and the appeal must have been preferred strictly within the time prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act. The Apex Court set aside the order passed by the Calcutta High

Court and allowed the Civil Appeal. Further, the Apex Court has categorically held that the discretionary power to adjust the period of limitation itself, must be specifically granted to the concerned quasi-judicial body or Tribunal and there must be a reasonable indication from the language of the statute that such a discretion, which is otherwise vested in Civil Courts, is also vested in the quasi-judicial body. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Apex Court mainly dealt with Sections 5 & 14 of the Limitation Act to the quasi-judicial bodies.

15. In the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, for filing an appeal before the TNREAT, Section 44(2) of the Act provides 60 days' time and the proviso confers the power to condone the delay without any limitation unlike Section 58(3) of the Companies Act. Section 58(3) of the Companies Act is a self-contained provision wherein there is no scope for condoning the delay beyond the period prescribed therein. When there is no scope for condoning the delay in filing an application before the Company Law Board under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Company Law Board entertained the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condoned the delay of 249 days. While deciding so in the detailed judgment, in various paragraphs, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply even to quasi-judicial bodies when such bodies are specifically empowered.

16. It would be appropriate to extract the following Sections and Rules of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the Tamil Nadu Real

Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017 and Limitation Act, 1963, which are relevant for the disposal of the above appeal:

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016:

Section 18: Return of amount and compensation.-

(1) If the promoter fails to complete or is unable to give possession of an apartment, plot or building,—

(a) in accordance with the terms of the agreement for sale or, as the case may be, duly completed by the date specified therein; or

(b) due to discontinuance of his business as a developer on account of suspension or revocation of the registration under this Act or for any other reason, he shall be liable on demand to the allottees, in case the allottee wishes to withdraw from the project, without prejudice to any other remedy available, to return the amount received by him in respect of that apartment, plot, building, as the case may be, with interest at such rate as may be prescribed in this behalf including compensation in the manner as provided under this Act:

Provided that where an allottee does not intend to withdraw from the project, he shall be paid, by the promoter, interest for every month of delay, till the handing over of the possession, at such rate as may be prescribed.

(2) The promoter shall compensate the allottees in case of any loss caused to him due to defective title of the land, on which the project is being developed or has been developed, in the manner as provided under this Act, and the claim for compensation under this sub-section shall not be barred by limitation provided under any law for the time being in force.

(3) If the promoter fails to discharge any other obligations imposed on him under this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder or in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement for sale, he shall be liable to pay such compensation to the allottees, in the manner as provided under this Act.

Section 35: Powers of Authority to call for information, conduct investigations.-

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, while exercising the powers under sub-section (1), the Authority shall have the same powers as are

vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [5 of 1908] while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:—

- (i) the discovery and production of books of account and other documents, at such place and at such time as may be specified by the Authority;
- (ii) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and examining them on oath;
- (iii) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
- (iv) any other matter which may be prescribed.

Section 44(5) Application for settlement of disputes and appeals to Appellate Tribunal.-

(5) The appeal preferred under sub-section (1), shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of appeal:

Provided that where any such appeal could not be disposed of within the said period of sixty days, the Appellate Tribunal shall record its reasons in writing for not disposing of the appeal within that period.

Section 53: Powers of Tribunal.-

(1) The Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [5 of 1908] but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure.

(3) The Appellate Tribunal shall also not be bound by the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [1 of 1872].

(4) The Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging its functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [5 of 1908] in respect of the following matters, namely:—

- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
- (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
- (c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
- (d) issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses or documents;
- (e) reviewing its decisions;

(f) dismissing an application for default or directing it *ex parte*; and

(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(5) All proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193, 219 and 228 for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, [45 of 1860] and the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [2 of 1974].

Section 57: Orders passed by Appellate Tribunal to be executable as a decree-

(1) Every order made by the Appellate Tribunal under this Act shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of civil court, and for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a civil court.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may transmit any order made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by the court.

Section 88: Application of other laws not barred. - The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.

Section 89: Act to have overriding effect. - The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

Tamil Nadu Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017:

Rule 27: Manner of implementation of order, direction or decisions of the adjudicating officer, the Authority or the Appellate Tribunal.-

For the purpose of sub-section (2) of section 40 of the Act every order passed by the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, shall be enforced by the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by the Civil Court in a suit pending before it and it shall be lawful for the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be, in the event of its inability to

execute the order, send such order to the Civil Court, to execute such order either within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the real estate project is located or in the principal civil court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person against whom the order is being issued, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain.

Limitation Act, 1963

Section 3: Bar of limitation. -

(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

(2) For the purpose of this Act -

(a) a suit is instituted -

- (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
- (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
- (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted—

- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
- (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;

(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.

Section 29: Saving. -

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of s. 3 shall apply as if such periods were the periods prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24

(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

17. It is relevant to extract the following paragraphs in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in *(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]*, which reads as follows:

“...

32. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our consideration:

I. Whether the CLB, being a quasi-judicial body, could be said to have the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013? In other words, even if Section 5 of the Act, 1963, per say, could not be applied to quasi-judicial bodies, whether the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 be made applicable to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, instituted before the CLB?

II. Whether Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which was brought into force on 01.06.2016 in order to empower the NCLT and NCLAT respectively, to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, could be given retrospective effect such that it applied to the CLB as well?

“...

41. Therefore, it now becomes necessary for us to examine whether the Act, 1963 would apply to those quasi-judicial bodies which are not specifically or expressly empowered to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963. Even if this is answered in the negative, would it be permissible for us to accept the submission made by Ms. Arora that the principles underlying certain provisions of the Act, 1963 should nevertheless be made applicable to such quasi-judicial bodies?

II. Whether the CLB, being a quasi-judicial body, could be said to have the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013?

a. The Act, 1963, per say, does not apply to quasi-judicial bodies - emphasis on the court as an institution.

...
48. On a careful scrutiny, it can be culled out that the aspect which pre- occupied this Court in the aforementioned two decisions is the absolute necessity of the 'court' or the system of courts as envisaged in the Constitution which ought to be held as solely capable of applying the provisions of the Act, 1963. Therefore, notable and significant emphasis was placed on which institution/body is seeking to employ certain provisions of limitation or exercise the powers entrusted under the Act,1963. The general rule, in this context, is a strict and unmalleable one i.e., it is only the courts which would concern itself with the provisions of the Act, 1963 unless expressly indicated otherwise in any special law governing quasi- judicial bodies.

...
52. This discussion which reveals that the application of the provisions of the Act, 1963 is "body/forum specific" would also be relevant in addressing a particular submission made by Ms.Arora - that Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which specifically empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to proceedings or appeals before itself, must be given retrospective effect such that it applies to the CLB as well. However, we shall deal with this submission, in the latter parts of our discussion.

b. Decisions of this Court as regards the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals

53. Insofar as the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies is concerned, this Court has always indicated that the same can only be applied to 'courts'. In Officer on Special Duty(Land Acquisition) and Another v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and Others reported in (1996) 9 SCC414, this Court had categorically held that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities which are not 'courts'. Therein, this Court was concerned with whether the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer could extend time.

...
58. The aforesaid decisions are direct authorities for the proposition that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 is not to be utilised by statutory bodies or authorities for the purpose of extending time or condoning delay. However, since heavy reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) to submit

that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must nevertheless be made applicable to statutory authorities or quasi-judicial bodies, we must see if the decisions of this Court in Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) still hold good.

c. Whether the principles underlying certain provisions of the Act, 1963 could be made applicable to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals.

59. We are aware that although the provisions of the Act, 1963 per say have been made inapplicable to applications or appeals before quasi-judicial bodies, yet the principles underlying the provisions of the Act, 1963, more specifically Section 14 thereof, have been made applicable to applications or appeals made before quasi-judicial bodies. This aspect of applying the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 was discussed in Parson Tools (supra).

...
65. The aforesaid approach taken in Ganesan (supra), by itself, is sufficient indication that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be applied to quasi-judicial bodies. However, to obviate any further confusion on this legal issue, we would like to take forward this conclusion arrived at in Ganesan (supra) a bit further and elucidate why the treatment as regards the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, must be different.

...
73. Insofar as the second condition referred to above is concerned i.e., that both the earlier and the subsequent proceedings must be before a court, this Court in M.P. Steel (supra) clarified that the word "court" in Section 14 has now been expanded to include tribunals as well, but only insofar as the abortive proceeding is concerned. In other words, the application under Section 14 must still be made before a "civil court" or a court as understood in the traditional sense, but the time which is sought to be excluded may pertain to proceedings undertaken before a quasi-judicial forum. It was observed thus:

"34. [...] This Court made a distinction between "civil court" and "court" and expanded the scope of Section 14 stating that any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a court would be a "court" within the meaning of Section 14. It must be remembered that the word "court" refers only to a proceeding which proves to be abortive. In this context, for Section 14 to apply, two conditions have to be met. First, the primary proceeding must be a suit, appeal or application filed in a civil court. Second, it is only when it comes to excluding time in an abortive proceeding that the word "court" has

been expanded to include proceedings before tribunals.”
(Emphasis supplied)

...

78. One might still take the view that the difference between extension and exclusion is only semantic. However, such a view would seriously misconstrue the plain language and intent underlying these two provisions. On the one hand, when the court extends time under Section 5, what essentially occurs is that the applicant is required to satisfy the court about the existence of a sufficient cause starting from the date on which limitation began till the actual date of filing. Upon being satisfied about the existence of sufficient cause, the court then extends the prescribed period of limitation itself till the date of filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be, such that the appeal or application is deemed to have been filed within limitation, under the eyes of law. In other words, the non-filing of the appeal or the application within prescribed period of limitation is only excused and the mandatory bar under Section 3 of the Act, 1963 is overcome by stretching out the prescribed period of limitation, through discretion, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

...

81. However, when an extension occurs under Section 5, the delay is, in clear terms, attributed to the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be. It is just that such a delay does not have the consequence of the application or the appeal being disallowed due to the mandate under Section 3 of the Act, 1963. The effect of Section 5 is that the period during which the sufficient cause persisted is not erased in the eyes of law; rather the prescribed period of limitation is discretionarily adjusted for the benefit of the litigant.

...

87. Despite the differences delineated above, as a last resort, one could possibly cite the discussion undertaken by this Court in *M.P. Steel* (supra) whereby, Sections 6 and 14 of the Act, 1963 and their underlying principles were equated and it was stated that both can be analogously applied to quasi-judicial bodies. Moreover, one would also be right in pointing out that while Section 14 is a computation provision, Section 6 is not. In that context, the question would arise as to why the rationale adopted for Section 6 cannot be true for Section 5 as well?

...

90. In light of all the aforesaid, it is our view that the discretionary power to adjust the period of limitation itself, must be specifically granted to the concerned quasi-judicial body or tribunal

and there must be a reasonable indication from the language of the statute that such a discretion which is otherwise vested in civil courts, is also vested in the concerned quasi-judicial body. We can think of two ways in which this can be done:

a. Through a proviso or a sub-section in the concerned section stating that the quasi-judicial body can extend time for filing the said appeal or application, as the case may be, upon the satisfaction that sufficient cause existed. To illustrate, such as sub-rule or proviso may read thus - “provided that the Company Law Board may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding 60 days” or “...within a further period of 60 days” or “... within a period of 60 days but not thereafter”. Courts have interpreted such provisions to confer a limited discretionary power to the quasi-judicial bodies to extend time.

We say that it is limited because the exercise of such discretion is subject to an outer-limit (which is 60 days in our illustration). If no such outer-limit is prescribed, then the discretionary power to extend time would be unlimited.

b. Through a separate provision within the scheme of the entire legislation stating that the quasi-judicial body would be able to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963(akin to that of Section 433 of the Act, 2013).

To illustrate, such a separate provision may read thus - “The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Company Law Board”. Such a provision would have empowered the CLB to exercise the discretionary power to apply Section 5 of the Act, 1963. We say so also because, at present, the NCLT and NCLAT do exercise their discretionary powers to extend time, as regards proceedings and appeals before themselves, due to the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. The only restriction to the exercise of such a discretion would be an outer-limit, if any, indicated by the concerned provision, owing to the use of the words “as far as may be” in provisions like Section 433 of the Act, 2013.

...

93. In the absence of any legislative intent being evident in the form of (a) or (b), it would not be proper for us to take the view that the principles underlying Section 5 must apply to such bodies, even by analogy. The argument that the principles underlying Sections 6 or 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, could be applied to quasi-judicial bodies is not sufficient reason to hold the same insofar as Section 5 of the Act, 1963 is concerned.

ii. The decision of this Court in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited.

94. As indicated by us in the preceding paragraphs, whether the provisions of the Act, 1963 stand excluded and more particularly, whether there is an embargo on the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must be examined conscientiously, keeping in mind the overall scheme of the Act in question and the intention of the legislature. The decision of a three-judge bench of this Court in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited v. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others reported in (2017) 16 SCC 137 has shed light on how such an exercise is to be conducted. It dealt with the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963 to an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter, the “DRT”) under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter, the “Act, 1993”).

...

98. The decision in International Asset Reconstruction Company (supra) furthers the proposition which has been well-cemented over the years that, one must carefully inspect and scrutinise the scheme of the Act and the intention of the legislature before conferring the power to extend time or condone delay to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. The exercise must be rooted in vigilance and not haste.

iii. Whether the CLB Regulations confer any discretionary power to the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 5 of the Act, 1963?

...

103. With respect to the issue with which we are concerned, we have already established that when the legislature has intended for a quasi-judicial body or a tribunal to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, more particularly, confer the power of ‘extension of time’, they have indicated the same in some way or the other, in an express manner. Regulation 44 cannot be resorted to in order to confer a power upon the CLB which the legislature in their wisdom did not intend to confer.

...

107. This discussion again goes to substantiate the view that, when the question is as regards the “extension of time” in the filing of an appeal or application itself, before a quasi-judicial body, we must be careful to not over read between the silences and instead, must look at whether there is any express indication to that effect. Whenever and wherever the legislature deemed it fit, it has granted either a limited or an unlimited power to extend time.

...

111. The entire question of how a particular provision of a special statute must be construed, for the purposes of limitation, directly arises as a consequence of the savings provision in the Act, 1963, which reads thus:

“29. Savings. - [...] (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

112. Section 29(2) states that, if any special or local law prescribes a certain period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is different from that of the Schedule to the Act, 1963, then it is that period of limitation under the special or local law which must be looked into and not those periods which are prescribed under the Schedule to the Act, 1963. Through a deeming fiction, the period prescribed under that special or local law is considered to be that which is prescribed under the Schedule to the Act, 1963 for the purpose of application of Section 3 of the Act, 1963.

113. Moving further, apart from ascertaining what would be the prescribed period of limitation, more often than not, the question is also whether Section(s) 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Act, 1963 could be made applicable to that specific provision in the special or local law. For this purpose, one must examine whether the special or local law expressly excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963.

...

124. The general rule as regards any appeal or application filed before a ‘court’ is that the provisions of the Act, 1963 would apply, unless indicated otherwise. This is precisely why one enters into the debate of “express exclusion”. However, the reverse is the general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are concerned i.e., that the provisions of the Act, 1963 do not apply, unless indicated otherwise. Therefore, the focus would shift to whether there is any “express inclusion” rather than an “express exclusion”. An exception to this shift in focus, or in other words, a reason why one would still look at whether sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 is “expressly excluded” is when the argument that the principles underlying certain provisions of the Act, 1963, like Section 6 or 14 must be made applicable to quasi-judicial bodies, succeeds or is being considered. This was the situation in Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra).

However, we have assigned elaborate reasons as to why we are not inclined to apply the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. Therefore, there arises no occasion for us to explore this aspect of express exclusion.

...

129. Therefore, the respondent herein must have preferred his appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 before the CLB, strictly within the time-limit prescribed therein.

III. Whether Section 433 of the Act, 2013 must be made retrospectively applicable or the change in law during the pendency of the appeal must be taken into account in the facts and circumstances of the present case?

...

131. Further, in the course of our initial discussion on whether the provisions of the Act, 1963 could, per say, be said to apply to quasi-judicial bodies, we had also indicated that the jurisprudence surrounding the application of the Act, 1963 is body/institution specific. In other words, the first step in approaching all such matters is to see whether the concerned body could be said to be a ‘civil court’ or not. If answered in the negative, then the endeavour is to figure out whether that body has been specifically empowered to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963. The general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are concerned, is that the provisions of the Act, 1963 do not apply unless indicated otherwise. Therefore, “express inclusion” as we had indicated earlier, must be present.

...

140. Some pertinent observations in this regard was made by the decision of this Court in Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and Others reported in (2011) 6 SCC 739 and the same is reproduced as follows:

“Law of limitation

29. Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural and its object is not to create any right but to prescribe periods within which legal proceedings be instituted for enforcement of rights which exist under substantive law. On expiry of the period of limitation, the right to sue comes to an end and if a particular right of action had become time-barred under the earlier statute of limitation the right is not revived by the provision of the latest statute. Statutes of limitation are thus retrospective insofar as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their operation for enforcing cause of action accrued earlier, but they are prospective in the sense that they neither have the effect of reviving the right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on that date. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edn. (2008), p. 321 while dealing with retrospective operation of procedural provisions has stated that provisions laying down limitation periods fall into a special category and opined that although prima facie procedural, they are capable of effectively depriving persons of accrued rights and therefore they need be approached with caution.

-xxx-

32. Limitation provisions therefore can be procedural in the context of one set of facts but substantive in the context of different set of facts because rights can accrue to both the parties. In such a situation, test is to see whether the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular type of case, would impair existing rights and obligations. An accrued right to plead a time bar, which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period, is nevertheless a right, even though it arises under an Act which is procedural and a right which is not to be taken away pleading retrospective operation unless a contrary intention is discernible from the statute. Therefore, unless the language clearly manifests in express terms or by necessary implication,

a contrary intention a statute divesting vested rights is to be construed as prospective.” (Emphasis supplied)

...

160. A conspectus of the legal and factual discussion on the power of the CLB to extend time or condone delay under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 is as follows:

i. The appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred by the respondent herein was filed during the period between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016. Therefore, although the appeal was made under the new provision of the Act, 2013, yet the body/forum before which it was made i.e., the CLB, was one constituted under the provisions of the Erstwhile Act. According to Section 10E(4C) of the Erstwhile Act, the CLB was a court only in the restricted sense. There existed no express provision which empowered the CLB to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 to the proceedings and appeals before itself.

ii. In multiple decisions of this Court, notable and significant emphasis has been placed on which institution/body is seeking to employ the provisions of the Act, 1963 or exercise the powers conferred under the Act, 1963.

iii. The provisions of the Act, 1963 (provisions that lay down a prescribed period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively) would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.

iv. In Officer on Special Duty (supra), Prakash H. Jain (supra) and Om Prakash (supra) respectively, this Court has unequivocally held that the power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated. It has been clarified that when such authorities or bodies are deemed to be a court for certain limited or specified purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended

beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created so as to confer powers under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 as well.

v. In Parson Tools (supra) and M.P. Steel (supra) respectively, this Court has developed a body of jurisprudence indicating that the principles underlying Section 14 of the Act, 1963 could be applied to the provisions relating to quasi-judicial bodies, unless there is any express indication to the contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision. However, there exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 respectively.

vi. The differences between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively are as follows - First, one pertains to the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the courts and the other is a mandatory provision independent of any exercise of discretion; Secondly, one refers to "sufficient cause" which term by itself is subject to a good amount of elasticity and the other has delineated well-defined conditions which must be met; and Lastly, one deals with the extension of time while the other is concerned with the exclusion of time.

vii. The principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively, cannot be analogously applied to proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies because in the former, the courts exercise their discretion in extending and more specifically, adjusting the prescribed period of limitation itself to create a fresh period of limitation. No entitlement as a matter of right arises vis-à-vis extension of time. Whereas, in the latter, the prescribed period of limitation remains intact, no delay is attributed to the litigant and the time during which the abortive proceeding was being prosecuted is expunged in the eyes of the law to place the litigant back or restore his position within the prescribed period of limitation wherein he is entitled to file the appeal or application, as the case may be, as a matter of right.

viii. The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation. Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, however, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct.

ix. Moreover, the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963 respectively also stand on a different footing for the reason that when the legislature has intended to grant powers of extension of time, the same has been expressly indicated either through the manner in which the concerned provision is phrased (more often than not through a proviso) or by the adoption of the Act, 1963 through a separate provision to the special law as a whole (akin to Section 433 of the 2013, Act).

x. Therefore, the decision of this Court in *M.P. Steel* (supra) would not apply analogously to a situation when the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 are sought to be applied by quasi-judicial bodies which aren't empowered in that regard.

xi. Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be.

xii. In *Ganesan* (supra), it has been settled that the savings provision in the Act, 1963 i.e., Section 29(2), is of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The question whether a certain provision in a special or a local law expressly excludes the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively arises only in pursuance of the savings provision under Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963. As a

natural corollary, if Section 29(2) is, by itself, inapplicable to a particular case then there would be no need to look into or analyse whether there is any express exclusion.

xiii. An exception to the aforesaid, i.e., a reason why one would still look at whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Act, 1963 respectively are “expressly excluded” irrespective of the application of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, is when the argument that the principles underlying those provisions of the Act, 1963, must be applied, is being explored.

xiv. Presently, we are dealing with an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 preferred before the CLB - a quasi-judicial body. We have also answered in the negative on the submission that the principles underlying Section 5 of the Act, 1963 must be applied. Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 is, therefore, of no relevance and there arises no occasion to examine whether Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 “expressly excludes” the application of Section 5 of the Act, 1963.

xv. The simpliciter limitation period prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 must not be read to be merely directory. The presence of any additional pre-emptory language in the form of “but not thereafter” or “shall” would not always be necessary to convey that the prescribed period is mandatory.

xvi. Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963, as far as may be, to the proceedings and appeals before itself, cannot be borrowed to signify the existence of a similar power with respect to the CLB. Moreover, the remedy of the respondent was already time-barred before the coming into force of Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, let alone the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. Hence, the change in law cannot enure to the benefit of the present respondent.”

18. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in *MANU/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]*, we find the following paragraphs are relevant for the application of the Limitation Act to the special or local law. The relevant Paragraph Nos.59, 62, 79, 90 are extracted below:

“59. Much has been said and argued on this provision. This provision throws light on the interplay between the 1963 Act and special or local laws. It comes into play when the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law. This provision applies to a suit, an appeal, or an application. The first part of this provision speaks of the application of Section 3 over which there is no quibble. It gives due recognition to the period of limitation provided under the special or local law and imports it into the Schedule. In fact, it provides for an automatic change in the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3. However, for determination of the period of limitation, Sections 4 to 24, pertaining to extension and exclusion, shall apply. Thus, Section 29(2) is the provision that triggers the activation of Sections 4 to 24. This applies ordinarily to every special or local law, unless such law contains an express exclusion of the 1963 Act. To put it differently, the intention to exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear, apparent and manifest. Therefore, the language of Section 29(2), indicates the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all special or local laws. A specific exclusion alone would take away its application. The application of Sections 4 to 24 can be excluded by such laws either individually or in totality. The provisions pertaining to the exclusion of time can also be applied at different stages. Suffice it is to state that Sections 4 to 24 will not apply only when their exclusion is expressly provided by such special or local law. In other words, there is a debarment of the exercise of any implied exclusion as a matter of rule. However, it can be done by the Court only in exceptional situations and that too, when the person claiming so discharges the burden of proving the same through the scheme of the legislation. Mere incorporation of a specific period of limitation under the special or local law does not amount to express exclusion of the 1963 Act. Rather, it must indicate that Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act are excluded. As a matter of rule, the said words must be present in the special or local law. Otherwise, it would amount to nullifying Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act.

...

62. To sum up:

From the aforesaid analysis of the provision, we hold that the compliance of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act is mandatory, with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion. Therefore, in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act can be read into such special or local law. This, we say so, notwithstanding the principle governing harmonious construction as Section 29(2) is a very unique provision which seeks to be taken note of in the interpretation of other statutes.

...
79. Thus, we hold that the 1963 Act applies to the 2013 Act. Any interpretation to the contrary would result in a situation as if both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section 103 of the 2013 Act have vanished from the respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible in law. We must also remain conscious that any interpretation having the impact of destroying a right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should be eschewed unless it appears so on the very face of it. Even when two interpretations are possible, the one that facilitates the filing of an appeal must be approved.

...
90. On a reading of the aforementioned judgment, we find that express exclusion is the general Rule and implied exclusion is only an exception that comes into play depending on the nature and scheme of the concerned legislation. Therefore, the onus lies heavily on the party claiming an implied exclusion to show the same. We have no qualms in holding that a case of implied exclusion has not been made out insofar as the 2013 Act is concerned, owing to its unique scheme. However, on facts, we find that in *Hukumdev (supra)*, this Court was concerned with a unique legislation being the Representation of the People Act, 1951 which contains an express provision in the form of Section 86 which states that if one misses the bus of limitation, then any election petition filed thereafter shall be dismissed summarily. Therefore, the legislation itself clearly mentions the consequences of a belated filing. Hence, the said judgment is clearly distinguishable insofar as its facts are concerned.”

19. After considering various judgments, including the extracted portions mentioned in Paragraph No.31 of the judgment reported in *MANU/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]*, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that the

compliance of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is mandatory with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of express exclusion, Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act should be read into such special or local law.

20. In the judgment reported in *MANU/SC/0138/2026[The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]*, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Paragraph No.90, observed that “express exclusion” is the general Rule and “implied exclusion” is only an exception that comes into play depending on the nature and scheme of the concerned legislation. Further, the Apex Court held that the onus lies heavily on the party claiming an implied exclusion to show the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the issue of implied exclusion of the Limitation Act, considered a unique legislature being the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which contains an express provision in the form of Section 86, which states that if one misses the bus of limitation, then any Election Petition filed thereafter shall be dismissed summarily. Therefore, the legislation itself clearly mentions the consequences of a belated filing of an Election Petition.

21. Sections 3 & 5 of the Limitation Act distinguishes the applicability of Section 5. Section 5 applies only for appeals and applications and not for suits. In other words, there cannot be a petition to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the original proceedings. Section 3 mandates itself applicability as indispensable.

22. In Paragraph No.90 of the judgment reported in **MANU/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]**, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that for the discretionary power to adjust the period of limitation, Section 5 should be granted to the concerned quasi-judicial body or Tribunal and there must be a reasonable indication from the language of the statute that such a discretion which is otherwise vested in Civil Courts, is also vested in the concerned quasi-judicial body or the Tribunal.

23. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant reported in **MANU/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]**, the Apex Court held that Sections 3 and 29(2) are wholly inapplicable to such proceedings unless the parent Act empowers such application.

24. On a careful reading of the provisions of the Act mentioned above, it could be seen that Section 18(2) of the Act makes it very clear that for claiming compensation in the case of defective title of the land on which the project is being developed or has been developed, the said claim would not be barred by limitation provided under any law for the time being in force. Therefore, it is clear that if there is defect in title of the land, the allottee can file a complaint seeking for compensation without any limitation. Therefore, the said provision makes it clear that in the case of any other claim apart from defective title of the land, the said claims are subject to limitation. If the legislature had no intention to apply

any limitation for the claims made under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, they would not have exempted the claims made by the allottees from the Limitation Act in respect of the defective title of the land under Section 18(2). The legislature has given exemption only in respect of the claims if there is defect in title of the land and not in respect of other claims.

25. Section 44(5) of the Act provides for condonation of the delay without any outer limit prescribed for condonation of delay.

26. As per Section 88, the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The said provision makes it is clear that the application of any other law including Limitation Act has not been barred.

27. As per Section 89, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, it shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.

28. As per Section 57 of the Act, every order made by the Appellate Tribunal shall be executable by the Appellate Tribunal as a decree of Civil Court, and for this purpose, the Appellate Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court.

29. As per Section 35(2) of the Act, the Authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of the matters mentioned therein.

30. As per Rule 27, every order passed by the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or Appellate Tribunal shall be enforced by the Adjudicating Officer,

Authority or the Appellate Tribunal in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by the Civil Court in a suit pending before it and it shall be lawful for the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or Appellate Tribunal in the event of its inability to execute the order, send such order to the Civil Court, to execute such order either within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the real estate project is located or in the principal civil court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person against whom the order is being issued, resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain.

31. When the legislature has intended for a quasi-judicial body or a Tribunal to apply the provisions of the Limitation Act, more particularly, confer the power of extension of time, they have indicated the same in some way or the other. In the case on hand, as already stated, Section 18(2) and Section 88 of the Act make it clear that Limitation Act shall apply to the proceedings under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act. The issue that was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34[Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]* was regarding the power of the Company Law Board to extend the time or to condone the delay under Section 58(3) of the Act. Ultimately, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings before the Company Law Board. Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 is a self-contained provision wherein there is no scope for extending the time. In the case of Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, Section 18(2) and Section 88 make it clear that the Limitation

Act is applicable, except in the case of a claim for compensation on the ground of defective title of the land. The Apex Court has not given any finding with regard to the applicability of Section 3. Therefore, the application of Section 3 to the claims made under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act remains intact. Section 3 of the Limitation Act clearly mandates that every suit, appeal or application filed after the period shall be dismissed, even if limitation is not raised as a defence.

32. As already stated, Section 18(2) expressly provides that claims relating to defective title shall not be barred by Limitation Act. The very existence of such provision clearly establishes that limitation is otherwise applicable to the proceedings under the Act. If the Limitation Act is not applicable at all, there was no necessity for the legislature to carve out such a specific exception under Section 18(2).

33. On a reading of Section 18(2) of the Act also explicitly shows that the limitation is applicable for claims under Section 18(1) as exemption is given specifically only under Section 18(2).

34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in **(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]**, cited supra, clearly observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply where the statute so provides. In the case of the proceedings initiated under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, the Act itself recognizes limitation.

35. A combined reading of Paragraph Nos.111, 112 & 113 of the judgment reported in *(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]* shows that limitation is applicable for special legislation also and the time frame of limitation is as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act or as per time frame given in the special legislation.

36. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in *Manu/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]*, the Apex Court held that the compliance of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is mandatory with the exception arising only by way of an express exclusion and in the absence of the same, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act can be read into such special or local law. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Limitation Act applies to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Further, observed that any interpretation to the contrary would result in a situation as if both Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 103 of the 2013 Act have vanished from the respective statutes, which is wholly impermissible in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held that any interpretation having the impact of destroying a right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should be eschewed unless it appears so on the very face of it.

37. The Real Estate Regulatory Authority and the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act are judicial Forums having the powers of a Civil Court.

38. Under Section 53 of the Act, the Appellate Tribunal is vested with powers on par with a Civil Court.

39. As per Rule 27 of the Tamil Nadu Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, every order passed by the Adjudicating Officer, Authority or Appellate Tribunal is enforceable in the same manner as a decree of the Civil Court.

40. As per Section 35(2) of the Act, the Authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of the matters mentioned therein.

41. Following the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **(2026) 264 Comp Cas 673 : 2026 SCC Online SC 34 [Property Co. P. Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda]**, **Manu/SC/0138/2026 [The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. Vs. S.V. Global Mill Limited]** and **CDJ 2016 SC 499 [M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. Noorjahan Beevi & another]** and also in view of Section 18(2) and Section 88 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, it is clear that Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.

42. It is pertinent to extract Article 27 of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows:

Description of suits	Period of Limitation	Time from which period begins to run
<i>PART II - Suits relating to accounts</i>		
27. For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency.	Three years	When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.

43. On a reading of Article 27, it is clear that the period of limitation of three years for claiming compensation for breach of a promise begins to run when the time specified arrives or the contingency happens.

44. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in **CDJ 2016 SC 499 [M/s.Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. Noorjahan Beevi & another]**, held as follows:

“...
 20. The above judgment of this Court was a case where the Court had taken into consideration the statutory power given to Financial Corporation under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act,1951 where the Corporation is entitled to take possession of the assets and transfer by way of lease or sale. Present is not a case where plaintiff can claim to exercise any power akin to Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The rights of the parties have to be determined as per terms and conditions of the agreement dated 20.9.1983. The terms of the agreement as noted by the High Court and referred to by us as above clearly indicate that on committing a breach of terms and conditions of the agreement the rights shall accrue to the plaintiff to sue for balance instalments and the damages for breach of contract. Thus, the right to sue shall not stand differed till either sale which took place on 20th May, 1985 or till the last date of payment of the instalment that is 20thSeptember,

1986. Both the courts below have rightly taken the view that limitation shall start running from the date the hirer defaulted in making payment that is on 20.5.1984 and suit has been filed beyond three years from the above date was clearly barred by time. Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also come for consideration before this Court in *Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri and others*, 2006 (11) SCC 506. In paragraph 13 of the judgment following was stated:

“13. What then is the meaning of the said words used in the guarantee bonds in question? The guarantee bond states that the guarantors agree to pay and satisfy the Bank “on demand”. It specifically provides that the liability to pay interest would arise upon the guarantor only from the date of demand by the Bank for payment. It also provides that the guarantee shall be a continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to become due to the Bank by the borrower. The terms of guarantee, thus, make it clear that the liability to pay would arise on the guarantors only when a demand is made. Article 55 provides that the time will begin to run when the contract is “broken”. Even if Article 113 is to be applied, the time begins to run only when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the contract was broken and the right to sue accrued only when a demand for payment was made by the Bank and it was refused by the guarantors. When a demand is made requiring payment within a stipulated period, say 15 days, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, if payment is not made or is refused within 15 days. If while making the demand for payment, no period is stipulated within which the payment should be made, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues, when the demand is served on the guarantor.”

45. In the above referred judgment, the Apex court has held that limitation shall start running from the date the hirer defaulted in making the payment and the suit filed beyond three years from the said date was clearly barred by time. In the case on hand, when the respondent promised to hand over possession of the Apartment on or before 30.09.2015, the breach of the contract would be from 01.10.2015. Therefore, the cause of action for filing the complaint would have

arisen on 01.10.2015 itself. Therefore, the three years period of limitation prescribed under Article 27 begins to run from 01.10.2015. In these circumstances, as per Article 27 of the Limitation Act, the complainant should have filed the complaint before the Adjudicating Officer on or before 01.10.2018, but for the reasons best known to them, they chose to file the complaint only on 28.12.2022, which is clearly barred by limitation.

46. The complainants cannot take their rights under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 as granted, negating the impact of doctrine of laches and provisions of Limitation Act as applicable to the original proceedings and approach the Authority or Member whenever, as desired by the complainants. It would only amount to abuse of process of law. The contention of the complainants that limitation shall run from the date of possession is legally not sustainable. The act of handing over possession is not a breach. The cause of action to file a complaint remains invariable and static on the date of breach as occurred on the date of completion as specified in the Agreement, irrespective of the subsequent performance of handing over of possession. Handing over of possession is the subsequent performance of the contract and the same is not a breach. Moreover, the performance of the contract (i.e.) handing over of possession is also accepted by the complainants. Handing over of possession does not create any fresh cause of action or reset the cause of action that arose on the date of breach as specified in the contract. Therefore, the contention of the

complainants that the subsequent possession amounts to continuous cause of action or fresh cause of action is legally not sustainable.

47. In the case on hand, the complainants were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in a proper manner. When the cause of action for filing the complaint arose as early as on 01.10.2015, they chose to file the complaint only on 28.12.2022. The complaint filed by the appellants/complainants before the Adjudicating Officer is clearly barred by limitation under Article 27 of the Limitation Act. As per Article 27 of the Limitation Act, for claiming compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time or upon the happening of a specified contingency, the time begins to run when the time specified arrives or the contingency happens. As already stated, the respondent promised to deliver possession by 30.09.2015. Therefore, the breach of the promise would be from 01.10.2015. When the respondent/developer failed to honor their promise as per the Agreement, the cause of action for filing the complaint would start from the very next day (i.e.) on 01.10.2015. Therefore, for claiming compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time or upon the happening of the specified contingency, the period of three years begins to run when the time specified arrives or the contingency happens. Therefore, the appellants/complainants should have filed the complaint within three years from 01.10.2015 (i.e.) on or before 01.10.2018 for claiming compensation. In these circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/ complainants is rejected.

48. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/complainants contended that awarding cost of Rs.1,00,000/- is not legally sustainable and is excessive when there is no finding given with regard to malice or abuse by the home buyers, therefore the observation that the appellants/complainants attempted to make unlawful gain without any supporting evidence is liable to be set aside.

49. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/promoter repudiated the above contention and contended that the appellants/complainants filed a complaint in C.C.No.66 of 2017 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai (South) claiming compensation for the delay in handing over possession. The said District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai (South) awarded a sum of Rs.2,41,816/- towards compensation. In such circumstances, for the same issue and for the very same cause of action between the same parties, which was heard and finally decided by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in C.C.No.66 of 2017, the appellants have filed the present complaint in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 on the file of the Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA again for compensation. For the very same relief sought for before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, the appellants/complainants have already got an Award for compensation. After being awarded compensation by the Consumer Commission, the appellants cannot prosecute the present complaint before the TNRERA for the very same relief. Even the copy of the order passed in C.C.No.66 of 2017 on the file of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission was produced only by the respondent/promoter and marked as Ex.B7 before the Adjudicating Officer. Knowing fully well that they have obtained compensation from the Consumer Redressal Commission in C.C.No.66 of 2017, the appellants have sought to claim another compensation for the very same relief. The appellants should have either prosecuted the complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission or in the alternative prosecuted the complaint before the TNRERA. They cannot prosecute both the complaints simultaneously and get compensation from two different authorities.

50. In these circumstances, we do not find any error in imposing cost of Rs.1,00,000/- on the appellants by the Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA.

51. Since we have held that the complaint filed before the Adjudicating Officer is barred by limitation, we are not giving any finding with regard to the other issues involved in the complaint.

52. The respondent/promoter in their counter have stated that the project has not been registered with the TNRERA under Section 3 of the Act, therefore, the TNRERA has no jurisdiction to try the complaint.

53. It is brought to the notice of this Court that this Tribunal had already directed the respondent/promoter to register the project with the TNRERA in Appeal No.25 of 2024 dated 29.01.2025. It is also brought to the notice of this Tribunal that challenging the said order, the respondent/promoter preferred an appeal in C.M.S.A.No.31 of 2025 before the Hon'ble Madras High Court and the

Hon'ble High Court had granted an order of interim stay in C.M.P.No.15033 of 2025 on 15.07.2025.

54. In view of the order of interim stay granted by the Hon'ble High Court, the respondent/promoter has not registered the project till date. Since the issue with regard to the registration of the project is pending before the Hon'ble Madras High Court and an order of interim stay is also in force, we are not giving any finding with regard to the maintainability of the complaint before the TNRERA.

55. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any error or irregularity in the order passed in C.C.P.No.54 of 2023 dated 29.10.2025 on the file of the Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA. The appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Connected the Miscellaneous Application is closed.

Sd/- xxxx
JUSTICE M.DURAIWAMY
CHAIRPERSON
01.07.2026

Sd/- xxxx
K.BABU
JUDICIAL MEMBER
01.07.2026

Copy to

1. The Adjudicating Officer, TNRERA
2. M/s.Prestige Estate Projects Ltd.
rep. by its Head Business Operation - TN
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Anna Salai, Nandanam,
Chennai, Tamil Nadu - 600 035.

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